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
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
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WARTIME INTEROPERABILITY PROBLEMS POSED BY DIFFERENCES  
IN SOUTH KOREAN AND UNITED STATES ARMY TACTICS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1980

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### ABSTRACT

WARTIME INTEROPERABILITY PROBLEMS POSED BY DIFFERENCES IN SOUTH KOREAN AND UNITED STATES ARMY TACTICS. by Major James M. Simpson, USA, 179 pages.

This study attempts to determine if there are serious problems which could result in time of war from differences in tactics used by Republic of Korea and United States ground forces. Although the Republic of Korea has adopted a form of American tactics, such factors as terrain, weaponry and the North Korean threat have dictated modifications in doctrine by the South Korean Army. The specific tactical forms analyzed in this study include the offense and defense, airborne, airmobile and amphibious operations, and several types of unconventional warfare operations.

Investigation reveals that there are many similarities between U.S. and R.O.K. doctrine, but that there are also several major differences, some of which are significant enough to cause needless casualties. A worst-case combat scenario is presented to demonstrate the possible effects of tactical differences.

The study concludes that the differences in R.O.K. and U.S. tactics are significant and warrant corrective action prior to combined combat operations. Differences in map symbology, equipment and force organization which could hamper combined operations are also highlighted.

The study recommends that U.S. forces in Korea be trained in Korean tactics, and that this concept be expanded to include U.S. forces elsewhere which have contingency missions for the area. The study further recommends that a U.S. Army field manual which explains the differences in tactics be published for reference. Finally, since analysis reveals that problems are minimized at lower echelons, it is recommended that cross-attachment of Korean and American units be accomplished at the lowest level possible.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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The study recommends that U.S. forces in Korea be trained in Korean tactics, and that this concept be expanded to include U.S. forces elsewhere which have contingency missions for the area. The study further recommends that a U.S. Army field manual which explains the differences in tactics be published for reference. Finally, since analysis reveals that problems are minimized at lower echelons, it is recommended that cross-attachment of Korean and American units be accomplished at the lowest level possible.



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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The . . . Chinese attacks . . . showed the ruthless character of their leaders, and the total discipline which they were able to impose . . . It emphasized the great importance of our learning to train and utilize friendly Asian manpower for Asian battlefields instead of sending our own troops into such an environment. In the end we had done quite well in developing the ROK Army, I thought, but we still had much to learn about the Oriental soldier... we must know him well if we are to continue to play an important political and military role in that part of the world.

General Maxwell D. Taylor<sup>1</sup>

Several points can be singled out from the above remarks by General Taylor, but one point is paramount--we still have much to learn about the Oriental soldier.

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

With the establishment of Headquarters, Combined Forces Command, Korea, the defense of the Republic of Korea is envisioned to be a combined effort in which American and Korean troops would fight side by side under a unified commander. American forces, however, all too often assume that Korean tactics and doctrine are the same as current American tactics and that operations orders will be executed exactly as intended by the American forces commander.

This thesis will demonstrate that differences in doctrinal thought, in the nature of the perceived threat to the Republic of Korea, in the

training and philosophical outlook of the Korean and American soldier, and differences in the tactics themselves can cause major tactical problems that could lead to unnecessary loss of lives in any future conflict. The purpose of this thesis is not only to point out the problems, but to develop viable solutions that may be applied prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

#### NEED FOR RESEARCH ON THE TOPIC

Despite Korea having been an extremely close partner of the United States for thirty-five years, there are a multitude of military coordination problems which have not been effectively resolved to this day. A large number of them result from the American short-tour policy, which results in the American soldier not being as familiar with Korea as he might be. Particular problems may be similar to those pondered by an American brigade commander after receiving an order from a Korean corps commander, which led him to

...an awareness of issues that demanded immediate resolution. Will our communications instructions work with those of the Koreans? How does an American field artillery unit provide fire for a Korean infantry battalion? How will my S4 supply the Korean units? Will orders in English be understood clearly by the Korean officers? And what problems lie ahead, as yet unknown but requiring immediate attention when they appear?<sup>2</sup>

Certainly, such problems are not unique to Korean-American operations, but they are problems which have not been resolved for the average soldier, including officers. The main reason for the establishment of the Combined Forces Command was to enhance interoperability between American and Korean forces. As one commander of I Corps (ROK/US) Group, (renamed Combined Field Army on 14 March 1980), phrased it:



Here we are working with two diverse cultures. A Korean staff briefing and an American staff briefing on the same subject may reflect the same format, and, on the surface, they may appear to reveal the same information.

But we know that cultural differences--the way of indicating objections, the time and the method of asking questions, and the manner of visualizing and expressing abstract concepts, for example--may lead to great differences in the conclusions and understandings that a Korean officer will form at an American staff briefing or an American will form at a Korean briefing.<sup>3</sup>

This thesis will demonstrate that many such misunderstandings are not so much the result of cultural differences as they are the result of physical differences between Korean and American tactical doctrine relating to specific operations.

The need for research concerning the differences in the two nations' tactics is evident from the preceding two quotations. One weakness in the American forces' relations with the Republic of Korea (R.O.K) Army over the past several decades has been an assumption that the Koreans have patterned themselves after the Americans. Although the Korean Army has patterned many of its tactical concepts after the American tactics, in an attempt to achieve a degree of interoperability\*, they are independent thinkers and have developed a form of fighting which is consistent with the Korean personality, terrain and perceived threat. To achieve the tactical interoperability which is now envisioned to be the cornerstone of allied operations in Korea, it is essential that these differences

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\*Interoperability is defined here as the ability of the Armed Forces of two nations to participate in combined combat operations with minimal differences in logistical needs, weapons, equipment, and tactical doctrine.

be recognized and that a concerned attempt be made to reconcile differences which could endanger combined operations.

Although military bibliographies concerning Korea are in existence, there are no direct sources on this subject. Operations in the Headquarters, Combined Forces Command, Korea, revolve around standard American Army tactics. It is assumed that the Korean officer understands the American concepts, but there are instances when this will not be the case.

#### PRESENTATION METHODOLOGY

To establish a foundation for the analysis of the tactics, this paper will first address the nature of the threat faced by the South Korean Army and the force organization which has resulted from the Korean analysis of that threat. Although United States tactics have evolved primarily to counter Soviet tactics, the R.O.K. must counter the perceived North Korean threat. North Korea, of course, may or may not follow Soviet tactics.

An argument may be made that the Koreans must be prepared to fight against Chinese tactics, considering both the Korean War experience and the probability that the North Koreans have also adopted some Chinese tactics through many years of active involvement with that nation.

The Korean analysis of the threat, not the U.S. analysis, is the main force which drives their precepts for tactical doctrine, modified, of course, by the need for interoperability with U.S. forces. Tactical doctrine dictates the need for a force structure, so it is necessary to discuss the current Korean Army force organization.

Although, ideally, the force structure would be conceptually tailored to fit the tactical doctrine; administrative, logistical and political restraints have dictated changes.

Furthermore, traditional and social forces' impact on the development of Korean tactical doctrine will be presented. Such characteristics as discipline and respect for authority, handed down through Confucianism and Buddhism for thousands of years, have developed a different kind of disciplinary and chain-of-command relationship than is common in Western armies.

The relative austerity of Korean life also imparts a different set of expectations of the capabilities and needs of the Korean fighting man. Primarily, this factor contributes to a more rigorous doctrine for tactical employment of the soldier in the field.

Historical factors which have contributed to the development of tactics will also be introduced, particularly the Japanese military influence, the impact of the Korean War, the United States military influence, and the Vietnam experience. One factor characteristic of most Korean Army operations is a pronounced emphasis on methodical planning and execution of operations.

The first field of tactics to be discussed will be conventional attack operations. Planning, coordination, task organization, and execution will be analyzed for the five major South Korean attack operations: the coordinated attack, the movement to contact, the reconnaissance in force, the exploitation, and the pursuit. Throughout the analysis of attack operations, particular emphasis will be devoted to the Korean infiltration unit.

Next, defensive tactics will be presented, beginning with an analysis of the American concept of the active defense. It must be remembered that this concept replaces to a large extent all previous U.S. defense doctrine.

The Korean defense will then be presented. It will become obvious to the reader that the major existing Korean defense tactics parallel the previous American techniques. There are distinct differences in the Korean application of these tactics, however. These differences will be analyzed as they apply to all actively practiced Korean concepts of defense.

The discussion of "special" operations will begin with airborne and airmobile tactics. There are distinct differences in the Korean and American objectives of the operation and in the selection of the objective area. Differences will be explored in the assault and overall ground operations phase of the operations. The impact of available equipment and the organization of Korean units will also be discussed, as they impact on the execution of operations orders.

The chapter on amphibious operations begins with an explanation of the American and Korean concepts of the composition of amphibious landing forces. Specific differences will be analyzed in the concept of the ground operations phase.

The discussion of unconventional warfare (UW) operations will be rather complex, because of the myriad of tactics, especially at small-unit level, which comprise unconventional operations. The Republic of Korea is faced with a primary enemy which is well-trained in unconventional warfare and shows every intention of using it. The South Korean officer is well-versed in some aspects of UW that are not normally considered in the American study of the subject. The concepts of both counter-unconventional warfare and counterguerilla warfare will be discussed. Infiltration operations include land, sea and air, all of which are actively practiced by the Korean Army.

Korean and American psychological operations and psychological warfare will also be analyzed. In a necessary divergence from the principal level of operation discussed in this thesis--the division--a comparative analysis will be made of small-unit operations during unconventional warfare. Map overlay symbology will be discussed. Although the graphics do not change the tactics, they certainly affect the way the tactics for a given operation will be interpreted when read from an operations overlay. In actuality, the differences between Korean and American graphics are not extreme, but this partial dissimilarity may be even more deceiving than would be the case were there two distinct, separate systems.

A separate chapter will be devoted to a summary of the problems posed by Korean and U.S. tactical divergences in all areas. The degree of significance of the tactical differences will then be discussed. Then the paper will address the necessity of resolving the differences, and the degree that the differences pose a problem to combined operations. The thesis will conclude with the real purpose of the research--methods of resolving the differences and minimizing their battlefield impact.

#### RESTRICTION OF RESEARCH

The research covers a fairly broad area, and some qualifications must be stated regarding restrictions on the topic. Only Army tactics will be addressed, despite the obvious interface between all elements of the Korean Armed Forces. The topic will be further restricted to Army division level and below, with primary emphasis at the division level.

## NATURE OF SOURCE DOCUMENTS

The research materials used in this thesis are predominantly primary source materials. Although several side issues are addressed in a variety of books and periodicals, the core of the analysis is derived from American and U.S. tactical field manuals. In addition to the manuals themselves, extensive use is made of reference materials used at the Republic of Korea Command and General Staff College, Chinhae, Korea. One assumption is that the doctrine propounded by the Korean College is an accurate reflection of actual Korean Army doctrine. This assumption is reasonable, in light of the fact that the corresponding American College at Fort Leavenworth is considered Army-wide to be the ultimate authority on U.S. tactical doctrine.

## TRANSLATIONS AND PHONETIC SPELLINGS

Translations of the Korean documents, particularly the Korean Army manuals, are the work of, and the responsibility of, the author. In addition, in those instances where it is necessary to include the phonetic spelling of a Korean term or place name, an attempt will be made to spell the word in such a way that the average reader can pronounce the word as accurately as possible.

END NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

<sup>1</sup>General Maxwell B. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 159.

<sup>2</sup>Lieutenant General M. Collier Ross and Major Charles E. Beckwith, "Burnishing the 'Shield of Seoul'," Army, p. 49, May 1979.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

## CHAPTER TWO

### NATURE OF THE THREAT FACED BY SOUTH KOREAN FORCES AND THE RESULTANT FORCE ORGANIZATION

Once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory--not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory.

General Douglas MacArthur<sup>1</sup>

This oft-quoted remark seems to reflect quite well the strategic and tactical thinking of today's South Korean Army. The acceptance of such an emphasis on quick, decisive victory is consistent with the American emphasis on winning the "First Battle" of the next war. Further, the concept is critical, considering Korea's "defense far forward" strategy, which dictates much of the current tactical doctrine.

### THE GENERAL SITUATION

In several prolonged discussions with officers recently returned from assignments in Korea, it became apparent that American forces have perceived the North Korean threat as being a smaller-scale version of the Soviet threat, in that the same tactics and principles of employment would be used with a smaller number of forces and over more limited terrain. A current final draft of FM 34-71, North Korean Military Forces, is being staffed, however, which brings the American soldier a detailed representation of North Korean Army life, tactics, and notional order of battle in unclassified form.



The new field manual is derived primarily from South Korean force translations. How closely the South Korean interpretation coincides with the actual American viewpoint, or how closely their interpretation coincides with the true state of affairs is unknown. Considering the relatively limited strategic intelligence assets of the Republic of Korea, however, there would naturally be some reservation concerning the preciseness of the information. The key point is that South Korea does perceive North Korean tactics as described below, and reacts accordingly. This chapter addresses how South Korea views the North Korean threat in the tactical employment sense. South Korea's perception of this threat is the driving force behind her Army's tactics, since the Korean situation is different from that of the United States. South Korea faces one major enemy in the world today, in her view, and the probability of reinforcement by Chinese or Soviet troops appears to have been assumed away to allow for concentration of thought on the prime actor--North Korea. Specific offensive and defensive tactics of the North will be presented, as taught at the Korean Army Command and General Staff College at Chinhae.

If North Korea attacks, U.S. intelligence indicates that the main thrust will include fourteen North Korean divisions with 800-900 tanks. An I Corps analysis maintains that any invasion would have to concentrate on a narrow front and would have to be launched in winter, as the armor could never traverse the soggy summer ricefields.<sup>2</sup> The North has the advantage of the attacker, with its attendant psychological advantages. South Korea is defense-oriented<sup>3</sup>, a situation which provides both the tactical advantage of the defender, yet also ingrains inherent uncertainties and psychological setbacks.

There are special problems presented to the defenders by the proximity of the DMZ to Seoul. Seoul is about thirty miles from North Korea. There are two traditional invasion corridors to Seoul, both of which, by virtue of the terrain, are still the most likely today. Because of the short distance, defense in depth is precluded if one accepts the defense of Seoul as essential to the defense of Korea, as the South Koreans do.<sup>4</sup> American commanders in the past have gone so far as to suggest the establishment of a second, alternate capital south of Seoul to allow the continuity of the Korean government should Seoul be captured, but the Korean government has felt the psychological harm engendered by such a move would outweigh the strategic advantages.

A blitzkrieg-type assault by the North would be difficult to halt north of Seoul, but the South is utilizing the defender's advantages to the maximum. Such accomplished measures as massive tank traps across much of the entire frontage of the DMZ would be difficult to cross. There is also talk of building a 35-foot high wall across the entire width of the country, along the lines of the Great Wall of China.

Should a major assault be launched, however, the strike would presumably be preceded immediately by commando and air strikes against communications centers, airfields and other critical military installations, with the intent of disrupting and confusing rear defensive areas. The attack would concentrate on Seoul, with FROG surface-to-surface missiles and high-speed aircraft striking simultaneously with little warning.<sup>5</sup>

South Korea attempts to counter this possibility by dispersing the preponderance of its forces around and well forward of Seoul, thus employing a

"defense far forward" strategy, somewhat analogous to the American strategy in Europe. The emphasis in the combat zone is on ground anti-armor weapons as opposed to tanks themselves. Since the terrain is not suitable for tank fighting, and maneuver is severely restricted, the anti-tank weapons may in fact be a more logical method of defending the nation, considering the exorbitant cost that would be involved in attempting to match the North Koreans.<sup>6</sup>

Here, one is presented with an interesting anomaly. The North is apparently concentrating heavily on a gargantuan tank force, yet the South Korean terrain as a rule is remarkably unsuited for tank warfare! Although roads alone provide the only well-suited avenues of approach, they are easily destroyed or disrupted. The majority of the country has extensive hill masses and mountains crossing its width and breadth. At the same time that the North is following an armor strategy, the South is abandoning it to some degree. A corresponding example is the American 2d Infantry Division, which has four infantry battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions, but only two tank battalions.<sup>7</sup>

In wartime, the Combined Field Army has operational control of three South Korean corps and over the only U.S. division in Asia. The CFA (formerly called I Corps) has lateral coordination with the Capital Corps in the West and the First ROK Army to the East.<sup>8</sup> The CFA, consisting of 185,000 South Korean troops plus the 2d Division, all traditionally under American leadership, has as its sole task the defense of Seoul (from forward positions). Lieutenant General James Hollingsworth, a recent commander (of I Corps),

maintained that any attack on Seoul would have to come through the I Corps' (western) sector, where thirteen divisions are poised.<sup>9</sup>

Much of the preceding can be described as joint U.S.-Korean thinking. One must also consider the South Korean perception of Pyongyang's broad, long-term goals and objectives. All Communist governments, in Korea's view, employ several tactics as part of their overall revolutionary strategy. These tactics include: propaganda based upon a cry for unification of workers across international boundaries (and in the specific case of North Korea, propaganda aimed at unifying the two nations under one Communist banner); a peoples' propaganda campaign, to incite rebellion of the masses; a National Assembly tactic, aimed at destroying parliaments from within as well as to destroy public support for elected officials; a fractional tactic, designed to create divisions between peoples of a free nation; the tactic of terror; and guerilla tactics.<sup>10</sup> Any Communist power with interests in Korea would strike ideologically at any weak elements of the society (a concept which perhaps prompted President Park's programs against "impure elements" of society), would exploit any religious or racial problems (both of which South Korea ostensibly lacks), and would strike at any military, political or economic weakness which could be found.<sup>11</sup>

The Communists would concentrate their forces in two wings: strong conventional forces to defeat the government, and guerilla units to defeat the people. The emphasis on guerilla units is well-founded in the case of North Korea, considering established guerilla units of up to 5000 members. The guerilla units would consist of armed units as well as supporting units, which include underground construction units and production ( manufacturing) guerilla units.<sup>12</sup>

With a population less than half that of South Korea's, and exports amounting to only 7% those of the South, North Korea is perceived by Seoul as unable to sustain any type of protracted war.<sup>13</sup> This lends credence to the theory of winning the early stages of the war. One must keep in mind that despite the North's lower population, their armed forces are considerably larger than the South's, since the entire society is geared for war, not for economic progress.

The South sees a more formidable danger in the differences in personality of the two Korean peoples, which is derived from the North's control of social life, including political, economic and life control, now firmly ingrained through "youths' and children's personality formation."<sup>14</sup> It is believed that the military-age youth of the nation have a fanatical hatred of South Korea and the United States, and have been so fiercely indoctrinated that they will gladly die on the battlefield, in the way the Chinese Communists behaved on the battlefields of the Korean War.

#### SOUTH KOREAN VIEW OF NORTH KOREAN TACTICS

The Republic of Korea has devoted considerable research to the subject of North Korea's ground tactics. Pyongyang's guerilla tactics will be addressed in Chapter Ten, Unconventional Warfare Operations. North Korea's offensive conventional tactics are addressed here, as they are perceived by the South Korean Army.

North Korean fire support at the division level is seen to include one battalion of 152-millimeter and two battalions of 122-millimeter field artillery. There are also eighteen 120-millimeter mortars at each regimental level, as well as thirteen 200-millimeter rockets. There are also

considerable numbers of 107 and 130-millimeter missiles and anti-tank weapons at regimental level. A tank regiment is thought to have thirty-three tanks of mixed T-62 and old-style T-54/55 models. Corps troops, in addition, are armed with 132mm and 200mm rockets, as well as twelve tubes each of 140mm nuclear-capable artillery. The RPG-2 and RPG-7 are in the hands of all units down to squad.<sup>15</sup> FROG missiles are also in use, and the intent of North Korean doctrine is to overwhelm the enemy with massive artillery and missile preparations, similar to Soviet doctrine.<sup>16</sup> The emphasis of their tactics is on tank-heavy formations concentrated along a narrow front.

The North Korean chain of command includes military officers and political officers down to company level, with the political officer having the greater degree of authority in daily affairs. The division staff includes a chief of staff, as well as four assistant commanders: a military ADC, an ADC for artillery, a rear area ADC, and an ADC for politics. The chain of command in general is thought to be cumbersome and unresponsive.<sup>17</sup>

#### North Korean Attack Operations

In the attack, the ADC for Artillery positions field artillery 300-400 meters behind the maneuver regiments. Artillery supports during the attack by firing, then moving with the maneuver elements. Since 1978, the North Koreans have employed the concept of "free guns". Once the attack has begun, designated firing batteries, on their own initiative, continue firing into enemy positions without benefit of forward observers by employing imaginary boundaries 250-400 meters beyond the boundaries used prior to the last displacement. The other major support technique is simply concentrated fires.<sup>18</sup>

Tank units will attempt to maintain a march speed of thirty kmph during the day and twenty kmph at night to press forward to the attack line, with an estimated range of 200 kilometers. The enemy will attack with tanks, interspersed with infantry. In addition to the main attack, the North Korean commander will employ attacks against small pockets of resistance, as opposed to the Soviet doctrine of bypassing such pockets. The force attacks with two echelons; the command post moves with the first echelon, and the reserves move behind the second echelon. The armor, moving with infantry, attempts to open up a passage through which forces can be poured, while the artillery maintains a constant barrage. Armor units will attempt to bypass strong positions, and will attempt primary use of high-speed roads. When possible, the North Koreans will attempt to concentrate overwhelming combat strength in the attack from the march.<sup>19</sup>

The principal missions, or objectives, of the attacking force are, in priority: the weakening of strategic reserves, attack of industrial facilities and principal military facilities, the detection and attack of large quantities of killing weapons, restraint and interruption of the enemy's movement, the "upsetting" of popular sentiment and public order, strategic reconnaissance, and destruction of ground forces.<sup>20</sup>

Rather than concentrating on the frontal assault, North Korean tactics will normally include a mixture of combined tactics. The first combined tactic is the combination of the frontal assault and circuitous movement, in which smaller elements, rather than merely conducting a supporting attack, will attempt to find the enemy flanks and move to his rear. The second method is the combination of the frontal assault and rear area

harassment, particularly destruction of the enemy's reserves and artillery, through the employment of airborne forces or previously-infiltrated commando units. Next is the combination of the flank battle and the pursuit, in which the North Korean force strikes the flanks as the primary target. The final tactic is the combination of active defense and rear area harassment.<sup>21</sup> The North Koreans, in all cases, will attempt to annihilate the enemy force, primarily through an extended war of attrition.

The South Korean Army sees the exploitable weaknesses of the North's combined tactics approach as the dispersion of troop strength, the danger in taking the time to attempt to annihilate each small unit they encounter, the limited use of joint operations by the North Koreans, the confusion of command and leadership engendered by the combination of tactics, supply limitations, and inability to conduct extended operations, given the will of the South Korean people.<sup>22</sup>

The North Korean force will conduct the attack in four phases: the movement phase, attack phase, combat-in-depth phase, and the pursuit phase. Although his objectives are assumed to be key terrain, he will normally not conduct a lengthy reconsolidation on the objective, but will instead pursue the enemy with annihilation as the goal. A division will attack on a frontage of six to ten kilometers, to a depth of fourteen to eighteen kilometers. The second echelon will follow at a distance of from six to eight kilometers behind the first echelon's rear boundaries.<sup>23</sup>


A defending South Korean or American force may witness an attack on the ground in the following manner. The North Korean division will occupy the "attack preparation area", six to eight kilometers in front of the FEBA,



about two to five hours prior to the attack. He will move forward with tanks and armored personnel carriers interspersed, and his infantry will dismount and begin the assault 800 to 1000 meters forward of the FEBA (150-300 meters at night). In one day, the division will attack to seize two regimental objectives three to five kilometers beyond the FEBA and two subsequent objectives ten to fifteen kilometers beyond the FEBA. An example of an attack phase diagram is shown below at Figure 1. Note that one North Korean division is expected to attack on a frontage roughly equal to one-half a South Korean division sector.

FIGURE 1

NORTH KOREAN DIVISION IN THE ATTACK<sup>24</sup>



The frontal attack shown at Figure 1 is actually a less-preferred method of attack, since whenever the opportunity presents itself, the North Korean force will conduct an envelopment.

The North Korean force will always attempt to use ridgeline approaches. The enveloping unit infiltrates secretly beforehand into a position near the enemy's flanks. The probable enemy withdrawal routes are intercepted by guerilla units infiltrated behind enemy lines well in advance. Finally, the envelopment maneuver will be conducted by means of small-scale units against similar-sized units.<sup>25</sup>

#### R.O.K. Countermeasures

The implications of the North Korean tactics for the development of countering South Korean tactics become self-evident from this brief portrayal. The first aspect, already mentioned, is the emphasis on security of the flanks. Flank security, to the South Korean officer, assumes added importance and emphasis. Additionally, forms of defense, to be addressed in Chapter Six, have incorporated further flank security measures. The second consideration is the heavy North Korean emphasis on infiltration, for the purpose of disrupting the rear and forming blocking forces. South Korean doctrine, therefore, must consider detailed countermeasures for preventing infiltration in the early stages, or the pre-invasion stages, of any war. Thus, one sees the complicated forms of counterinfiltration operations discussed in Chapter Ten. North Korean doctrine, also, allows for a much greater latitude on the part of small-unit commanders to conduct independent or semi-independent combat operations than, for example, the Soviet commander. Hence, South Korean commanders must also be trained to

operate semi-independently at the company level, and operations plans and communications systems must be so designed that the separate action of a small-unit commander will not jeopardize the accomplishment of the larger mission by the division. One would assume, also, that the severe Korean terrain, with its myriad of separated hills and mountains, will isolate small units on occasion.

Probably the most important consideration from the viewpoint of Korean-American interoperability is the emphasis on the retention of key terrain. The United States Army bases its current tactical doctrine on the assumed Soviet threat. Our active defense, for example, is force-oriented rather than terrain-oriented. The typical South Korean commander, however, perceives an enemy whose tactical objectives center on the retention of key terrain, and he will most certainly attempt to deny that key terrain to the enemy.

#### North Korean Defensive Tactics

The analysis of North Korean defensive tactics is much simpler than that of the offense. The North Korean defense parallels the Soviet concept in many ways. The South Korean Army views the North as employing two major forms of defense: the position defense and the mobile defense. In the position defense, which closely parallels Soviet doctrine, there are three echelons: two defensive echelons and the division rear area.

The North Korean division is believed to defend on a front of twenty to thirty kilometers. The security force, operating to a depth of fifteen kilometers along this entire front, consists of a motorized rifle regiment. The first defensive echelon, seven to ten kilometers deep, is defended by two regiments, each having two battalions forward and a battalion

minus back, as well as a company held as regimental reserve. The division command post is also located in the first defensive belt. Unlike the Soviet defense, there is no "dead space" between defensive belts. The second defense belt, consisting of one motorized rifle regiment and one tank regiment, is located directly behind the first defense belt and extends to a depth of fifteen to twenty kilometers. One of the motorized rifle battalions is withheld as division reserve, with its primary mission that of a counterattack force. The division rear area, in the "third belt", extends up to fifty kilometers. Significantly, the defensive positions are located on key terrain, and North Korean forces do not prepare supplementary defensive positions. They are expected to hold the terrain at all costs.<sup>26</sup>

During the Korean War, the North Koreans dug defensive bunkers on both sides of hills, connected by trenches. During Allied artillery preparations, they moved to the reverse slope. As the Allied forces advanced, they used the trenches to move to the forward slope.

The North Korean operation dubbed the mobile defense is undertaken when the position defense has failed. Rather than withdrawing to alternate positions, the battle area is simply reorganized. The first defense belt still consists of two regiments, reinforced by the motorized rifle regiment (minus) from the second belt. The second belt consists of the tank regiment and the reserve battalion. The first echelon will attempt to find an enemy weakpoint and encircle or overrun the weakened unit. The tanks will then push through and attempt to turn the defense into a limited-objective attack.<sup>27</sup>

Although the defense holds fewer implications for South Korean tactical doctrine, a few points stand out. Again, we see the emphasis on

retention of terrain. South Korean forces, to be successful, must deny this terrain to the enemy. Also, since ultimate hope of the North Korean defense rests on their force mobility, the South Korean Army must have a responsive mobile force and the tactics to correspond.

#### SOUTH KOREAN ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

Two major shaping influences on the Korean force structure are evident from the preceding discussion. The first is the positioning of the majority of South Korean forces near the Demilitarized Zone, north of Seoul. The frontline forces are organized into task forces of 750 troops, each unit positioned in fortified strongpoints with no intent to retreat, but with plans of reinforcement. All of these strongpoints are dug deeply into mountains.<sup>28</sup> One such regimental commander expressed to the author that his regiment, among others, is satisfied to consider themselves a "suicide squad" if the need should arise.

The next factor is the sheer size of the South Korean forces, which are about the seventh largest in the world. South Korea perceives one threat, and has organized to defend itself against that one threat. Although some nations such as the United States, which has to remain prepared to counter enemies around the world, might view the "one threat" concept as somewhat of a luxury, it must be remembered that North Korea also has one avowed enemy and is directing all its efforts to that one enemy's defeat.

South Korea has an annual defense budget of approximately two billion dollars. The Army, 560,000 men strong, consists of one mechanized division, 19 infantry divisions, two armored brigades, five special forces brigades, and two air defense brigades, as well as seven tank battalions and 30

artillery battalions. In addition, there are two SAM brigades with Hawk and Nike Hercules missiles and a SSM battalion equipped with the Honest John. Although the force is obviously infantry-heavy and light on armor, the Army does possess 880 medium tanks and over 500 armored personnel carriers. There are also 1,100,000 soldiers in the Army Reserve.<sup>29</sup>

Combat units are arranged around the regimental system. A division has three regiments, and a regiment has four battalions. The assumption is that the regimental system is more responsive to the combat situation, in that the regiment handles combat support and combat service support functions, including administration, rather than being solely a tactical headquarters, as is the American brigade.<sup>30</sup> The four-battalion regiment is the direct result of the North Korean doctrine of attacking the rear area. In the R.O.K. regiment, two battalions are primary combat forces, one is the reserve battalion, and one is used solely for rear area security. See Appendices B, C and D for organization and equipment of the R.O.K. division in detail.

The force structure does have some impact on tactical employment. The major impact is on deployment of forces. The triangular structure of the division leads to the almost inescapable triangular positioning of forces in tactical operations. Of tactical solutions presented at the Korean Staff College, at least 95 percent of solutions to conventional operations consist of the familiar "two up and one back" configuration.

## SUMMARY

Whereas American forces are trained to combat Soviet/Warsaw Pact-type tactics, South Korean troops train to fight against North Korean tactics. North Korean tactics are apparently an amalgation of Soviet and Chinese tactics, adapted over the years to the Korean situation. If the South Korean perception of their own terrain is accurate, then the North's concentration on mobile armor forces may well be a mistake on their part. In any event, both American and Republic of Korea forces do intend to fight enemy tanks and dispose forces and weapons accordingly.

The major strategic difference is the American Army's concept of defense in depth. The Koreans prefer to concentrate the bulk of their forces forward of Seoul to stop the enemy drive before it penetrates the 36 kilometers to the capital. The rest of their forces in the Third ROK Army sector are positioned to prevent infiltration and the less likely event of invasion from the rear.

The principal tactical difference revolves around terrain. The American forces, by doctrine, are trained to concentrate on the enemy force, whereas South Korean forces orient toward key terrain and its retention.

Subsequent chapters will develop a greater degree of detail concerning more specific, situation-oriented differences.

END NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

<sup>1</sup>Allen Guttman, Korea and the Theory of Limited War, (Boston: Heath, 1967), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Russell Spurr, "The Hollingsworth Line," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 27, 1976, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup>William V. Kennedy, "Yankee, Don't Go Home", Army, March 27, 1977, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup>Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 7.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Major William J. Diehl, Jr., "2d Infantry Division", Infantry, 68, November-December 1978, p. 17.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>8</sup>Lieutenant General M. Collier Ross and Major Charles E. Beckwith, "Burnishing the 'Shield of Seoul'", Army, May 1979, p. 50.

<sup>9</sup>Russell Spurr, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>10</sup>Republic of Korea, Communist Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), pp. 25-27.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>13</sup>Republic of Korea, Army, North Korean Research (Advance Issue Material), (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. 20.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 28-29.

<sup>15</sup>Republic of Korea, Army, Enemy Attack Tactics (Advance Issue Material), (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), pp. 5-6.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 13-14.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 22-23.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 24-25.



<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., pp. 34-35.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 36-37.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>26</sup>Republic of Korea, Army, Enemy Defensive Tactics (Advance Issue Material), (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), pp. 7-29 and Handout 1.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 43-45.

<sup>28</sup>Spurr, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>29</sup>London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Korea, Republic of", Air Force Magazine, 60, December 1977, p. 107.

<sup>30</sup>Republic of Korea, Army, FM 101-10-1, Organizational Descriptions and Military Logistics Resources, (Seoul: Korean Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 1-1 thru 1-13.

## CHAPTER THREE

### TRADITIONAL AND SOCIAL FORCES' IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOREAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

Military operations of any nation's army must invariably reflect a portion of that nation's heritage and social outlook. A people who are by nature aggressive can be expected to carry out tactical operations aggressively. A nation such as the United States, which is undergoing a massive experiment in volunteerism, can be expected to provide certain amenities to its troops, which they will certainly expect, at least to a lesser degree, even during combat. The logistics involved in operations in this latter example will almost surely modify the manner in which operations will be executed. On another level, the industrial base of a nation will dictate to what degree combat will be dependent upon supplies and technologically-advanced equipment, and the corresponding tactics will surely vary.

This chapter examines some social and historical factors which have, to varying degrees, helped give direction to South Korean tactical doctrine.

#### SOCIAL INFLUENCES

Korea's traditional philosophy can be described as a combination of Buddhism and Confucianism. There is one characteristic which is outstanding in both--respect for authority. Although Buddhism is passive and pacifist to a much greater degree than Confucianism, both philosophies stress obedience by the younger to the elder, by the "vassal" to the "master", by the wife to the husband, and in all cases, obedience toward

anyone who is placed in a position of authority. If one assumes that this thinking pervades military life, as well, one should expect to find the Korean Army in a state of high discipline. The South Korean Army, in fact, is rather renowned for this characteristic. An examination of Korean home life today reinforces this assumption. The Korean social system is characterized by the extended family concept. Children are taught from an early age to respect their elders, and the substance and form of familial fidelity are rigorously enforced.

This process is facilitated by the language itself, in that there are "high" forms of address and verb endings, as well as forms to be used among equals and friends and "low" forms to be used to lessers and to younger people. By repetitive use of the proper verb forms and pronouns, one rapidly becomes knowledgeable of one's social position. Similarly, it is simple for one Korean to "put down" another by the deliberate use of a "lower" verb form.

The use of language form, as well as the assumption of obedience from anyone who is placed in an inferior or subordinate position, are characteristic of the Korean Army today. The enlisted man is required to use the polite forms of address to an officer, and the officer is likewise required to use the blunter forms of address, to preclude familiarization. There is considerably less fraternization between officers and non-commissioned officers in the Korean Army than one observes, and takes for granted, in the American Army. The principles of democracy, although probably well-suited to the Korean people as a whole, do not fit into the Korean military system.

Reinforcing the Korean officer's authority is the acceptance of physical abuse of subordinates, although this concept is widely misunderstood among Americans. The Korean officer or non-commissioned officer has a unique method of "physically striking" a miscreant subordinate, which appears to be exactly the same way a Korean parent "strikes" a child. The target is always the forehead or the hair immediately above the forehead. The hand is clenched into a loose fist and the "blow" is really a glancing scrape, accompanied by a fierce scowl and an imprecation such as "ee kae-saekkiya" (you son of a dog). To the casual observer, this treatment, especially to a child, is distasteful and appalling, but there is little or no physical pain associated with it, although it looks like a cruel blow. The punishment is psychological, with the added implication that "since I am laying hands on you, I am demonstrating that I can physically harm you if I wish." The acceptance of such treatment reinforces the values of respect instilled in each Korean since birth, and helps ensure a greater degree of discipline than one would expect among Western Armies. This statement must also be qualified, in that discipline in the U.S. sense of the word is of a different variety. FM 22-100 defines discipline as the "willing obedience" to orders. Although the Korean notion of discipline entails this concept as well, there is also an element of fear of authority and fear of retribution which occasions prompt obedience.

Insofar as the impact of obedience on tactics, there is little basis for presupposing any direct effect; however, in the execution of those tactics, one would rightfully assume that the Korean officer would expect his orders to be unflinchingly carried out, and that freedom of

action would be restricted, in that the senior is expected to make the decision in nearly every case. Similarly, with the Korean notion of not embarrassing a superior, in that he is always correct (otherwise, he would not be the superior) one would anticipate that the Korean officer would be reluctant to change an order, and would be rigid in expecting an original order to be carried out exactly as intended.

#### PHYSICAL INFLUENCES

A similar cultural factor which impacts on the execution of tactics is the Korean way of life itself. Without belaboring the point of Korea's economic miracle in recent years, it is understood that the Korean standard of living has dramatically increased in modern years. Nevertheless, compared to the American way of life, for example, there is a great disparity. Particularly among the lower-income families, many physical comforts are non-existent. Although sanitation is good, for example, a lack of hot-water facilities in the home has endowed many Koreans with a habituation to cold water baths outdoors, even in the winter. The diet is relatively austere. The result of this combined economic and cultural condition is that the typical Korean soldier is fairly inured to physical discomfort and hardship. The Korean commander can reasonably expect more of his troops than an American commander might expect in the same situation. He can plan operations which involve his troops spending a winter night in an infiltration objective without food or shelter, still prepared to execute an attack the next morning. Although certainly the American commander can expect the same of his men, American tactical planning normally assumes such a plan is undesirable, and will normally work around such an eventuality.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES

The spirit and will of the South Korean soldier also cannot be discounted as fighting factors. Korea spent centuries as a defeated people. From the Mongols of Genghis Khan to the Japanese in this century, Korea has been conquered by outsiders many times, and they are determined not to be subjugated again.

They look to Israel as a nation of parallel circumstances and as a model for their own national spirit.<sup>1</sup> As a nation created at the same time as Israel, they view Israel's successful repulsion of invading forces as an extension of the Korean situation, and are aware of the large role played by the determination of the people ("Israel jungshin"). Korean officers study the Three-Days' War with fervor, not so much for an understanding of the tactics (which are not adaptable to the Korean terrain) but to grasp the significance of an operation which is executed daringly, violently and with the fervor of an army intent on preserving their nation's heritage. Accordingly, the ferocity of a successful operation is stressed throughout Korean tactical doctrine, and speed and shock action are paramount.<sup>2</sup>

## MILITARY EDUCATION OF KOREAN OFFICERS

The officer training and educational systems also have a significant impact on the types of tactics employed. Pre-commissioning institutions include the Military Academy at Seoul, ROTC programs, and branch officer candidate schools.

There are distinct parallels to the corresponding American schools. One reason is the close relationship which exists with the Americans, of

course, and the extent to which Korean officers have been trained in American schools. From Fiscal Year 1950 through Fiscal Year 1977, for example, 34,024 Korean military personnel, the bulk of them Army officers, were trained in the United States under the International Military Education and Training Program. This figure includes 180 individuals during Fiscal Year 1977.<sup>3</sup> One of these students' primary missions, in addition to learning the required material, is to acquire new educational techniques. These techniques, within the framework of the Korean personality and the training aids and resources available, have generally been incorporated into the Korean system.

There are also some significant additional training elements. For example, in the Korean Military Academy at Seoul, a great number of hours are devoted to the practice of Tae-kwondo, the Korean version of Karate. It is intended that every graduate hold a black belt in the sport prior to graduation. The greatest difference in application between the Korean martial arts and the American version taught in U.S. basic training is that Tae-Kwondo, at least in theory, is envisioned to be a useable form of combat. Verbally at least, the Korean Army stresses that close combat may be acceptable, since the South Korean soldier (enlisted as well as officer) can "smash the North Korean puppet" with his bare hands if need be.

Once the Korean officer is commissioned, he attends an officers' branch basic training course. As he progresses to the rank of captain, he attends an advanced course of nine months' duration. Several officers, after graduation, are selected through an examination process to attend advanced courses in the United States, West Germany, Taiwan or Indonesia.

One finds in the advanced courses the basis of the senior service college educational system. First, the emphasis on examinations to determine eligibility becomes evident. Officers are selected to attend the advanced courses by the examination process. They were admitted to their pre-commissioning programs on the basis of examinations; they were admitted to college, high school, middle school and even into the sixth grade solely on the basis of examination results. Consequently, by the time an officer has attained field-grade rank, he has not only demonstrated tactical and leadership proficiency, but has demonstrated a superb capability for taking and passing examinations.

This effect is obvious by the time an officer is admitted to the Korean Army Command and Staff College (called simply the "Army College") at Chinhae, Kyungsang-Namdo. The typical officer selected has had a successful command as shown by his Officer Evaluation Reports, is thirty-six years old, and has scored well on the national competitive examinations used to determine eligibility for the Army College.<sup>4</sup> Regardless of one's previous military record, the examination is the primary criteria for selection, while the other considerations are primarily qualifications for being allowed to take the examination. If an officer does not graduate from the Army College, his chances for promotion are slim.

The system used for the national examinations is similar to the type of evaluations used within the schools as well. Many officers carry notebooks with them throughout their career, containing lists of elements related to specific operations, which are expected to be memorized. This system is also the rule in civilian educational systems, as well, beginning



with elementary school. The typical officer, then, is conditioned to devote his time and energy in academic pursuits to rote memorization of lists.

There are advantages to this method, as well. Whereas the American officer, for example, may look for the appropriate field manual to refresh his memory on specific operational graphics or the format for a particular type of order or annex, the Korean officer is expected to have all such matters memorized by the time he is a captain. On the other hand, the quality of innovation, analysis and independent thinking is obviously degraded by the constant emphasis on repetition and memorization.<sup>5</sup>

What does this system mean to the adaptation of tactics? There appears to be an unwritten law that changes in tactical doctrine are undesirable, since the application of the doctrine depends to a large extent on the ability of its executors to carry out operations without a great deal of thought beforehand. Rather, if an Army officer has studied a specific type of operation in detail for ten years, he may be expected to operate automatically in a pre-determined manner in any specific situation. If the concept of the defense is changed drastically, for example, an entire Army must erase years of "indoctrination" in all the facets of the operation, and must begin years of new memorization of details. Officers might thus make a distinct tactical blunder on the battlefield, in a moment of indecision. The goal of the current system, then, might be characterized as eliminating any possible indecisiveness by ensuring automatic response.

It appears necessary for all factors of an operation to be quantified. The situation must be well-known in advance, and all operations must

be analyzed prior to execution against several memorized lists of considerations. The unknown, to the Korean officer, must be eliminated if possible, before jumping off an operation.

As a result of the military educational system, three factors stand out which may be presumed to impact on Korean tactics. First is the knowledge level of the average officer. He can be expected to know all types of operations in great detail, insofar as planning considerations are concerned. He may be expected to be comfortable with detailed, intricate operations, because he has practiced them for years and has a ready detailed knowledge. The same factor would minimize innovation and independence; all small-unit leaders can be expected to execute an operations order in essentially the same manner. This consideration would force the necessity of detailed planning, and this type of planning is also consistent with the Korean system.

#### JAPANESE MILITARY INFLUENCE

Having addressed internal influences on the Korean Army, let us now turn our attention to external influences. The most important influence in modern times, until the beginning of the American involvement in Korea, was the occupation by the Japanese from 1910-1945. The Japanese rule was characterized by a centralized, bureaucratic administration in which the high-handedness of the Japanese was justified in their own eyes by its efficiency.<sup>6</sup> The Japanese attempted to eradicate the Korean people as an entity by obliterating the Korean language, and, through intermarriage, obliterating the Korean people as a separate race. They were completely unsuccessful in the latter, as a result of disdain for the Koreans by the

Japanese colonizers.<sup>7</sup> They were successful at shifting the values of Confucianism to a philosophy of "obedience to an imperial autocrat".<sup>8</sup>

The Japanese did extend a strong influence throughout the military. In 1938, they introduced military training in all Korean secondary schools, and through the Special Volunteers Act of 1938, allowed Koreans, "by special Imperial Grace", to join the Japanese Army.<sup>9</sup> Many Koreans served in the Japanese Army during World War II, willingly or unwillingly. Several men who were to become the leaders of the new Korean Army after World War II were trained at the Imperial Defense College in Tokyo and the Manchurian Academy. Of the twenty Tokyo graduates still alive at the end of the war, there developed five of the first seven Chiefs of Staff and three of the Ministers of Defense between 1948 and 1961.<sup>10</sup> Of those who were still student officers in 1945, many rose to high positions in the Korean military, including five of the six Chiefs of Staff from 1960-1966.<sup>11</sup> Other Chiefs of Staff and senior officers came from officers of the Special Army Volunteer System of 1938 or men who had served as Japanese conscripts, attending officer training in Korea after the War.<sup>12</sup>

The first Korean Army after World War II was armed primarily with "scrounged" Japanese rifles and machine guns confiscated from Americans who had stolen them as souvenirs.<sup>13</sup> An ironic twist is that even after liberation from the Japanese, the Japanese were respected. A sword received from the Japanese emperor as a token of recognition for service was "at least as useful for legitimizing (one's) position as an act of Korean patriotism."<sup>14</sup> The American ideals after the War were not nearly as acceptable to the Korean mind as had been the Japanese example. As Gregory Henderson has described it:

American views of equipment as 'expendable,' 'off-duty' sales to the black market, and 'informality' in using jeeps to transport girl friends created unfavorable comparisons with the strict discipline of Japanese use of equipment and a weak climate of respect at the top.<sup>15</sup>

Even today, there is some similarity in the Korean view. Despite the obvious respect shown to Americans in Korea, the senior Korean officer does not take the average American officer seriously, seeming disturbed by the American's preoccupation with real estate, with automobiles, with women. Such considerations are secondary to the Korean officer, who is concerned foremost with how to protect his nation and who has little time to ponder his personal possessions. These statements are in no way intended to degrade the American officer, but are intended to convey something of the mental attitude of the South Korean. This facet of Korean thinking was acquired from the Japanese. Despite the cruelty and the ruthlessness of the Japanese, their effectiveness cannot be questioned.

It is apparent in reviewing tactics that the current Korean forms are little dependent upon the previous Japanese versions. The American influence has been all-pervading; even a casual review of South Korean tactical doctrine demonstrates that it was patterned after American doctrine. The impact of the Japanese on tactical form can be minimized simply; the northern half of Korea was of course also occupied by the Japanese, yet there is no resemblance between North and South Korean tactics. The major influence has been that of the latest significant ally--in North Korea's case, the Soviets and the Chinese Communists.

What, then, has been the impact of the Japanese on the South Korean Army? The first effect is obvious; most of the leaders of the Korean Army in the 1940s through the 1960s (including President Park Chung Hee) were

Japanese-trained. Their formulation of military policies and doctrine quite obviously reflected their experiences and training. The authoritarianism of the Korean Army and of the government itself can be traced at least indirectly to these roots with a minimum of reflection.

The remaining facet of Japanese influence which does have a considerable bearing on the Korean Army is the psychological aspect. The value of the military in society, even its predominance, is a direct descendant of the Japanese system. The intrinsic worth, the ideals, of the military as a profession is reinforced by the incredibly "sharp" bearing and the pride in wearing the uniform displayed by the Korean soldier, down to the private. The strict discipline, which also has its origin in the Korean Armies of thousands of years ago, was certainly strengthened by the Japanese Army system. But perhaps the greatest impact on the Korean Armed Forces has been the Japanese ideology of the power of the mind. If you have the will to do something, it can be accomplished against overwhelming odds. This psychological factor, as observed in the Japanese, has been described in the following way:

In general, there was no significant difference in our solutions, except in situations when one side was so hopelessly inferior that, in my judgment, it should retreat or at least dig in on a defensive position. In such cases, the Japanese solution was almost always to attack at night, a manifestation of the unshakeable faith in the Japanese seishin, translatable as spirit or morale, which was presumed able to overcome all material obstacles. ..I would say that the Japanese commanders in World War II behaved about as predicted in my study and that seishin proved a formidable but fortunately not an invincible force which eventually succumbed to superior American fire power.<sup>16</sup>

Generally, if one transcribes the word "seishin" to the corresponding Korean word "jungshin", an excellent description of a modern Korean

Army program can be depicted. "Spiritual War Power" is a major aspect of Korean Army training. Concurrently, such tangible concepts as the night attack when outnumbered remain a part of Korean doctrine.

#### IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR

Following liberation from the Japanese, the next important factor on the development of the Korean Army was the Korean War. Surprisingly, little can be said about the War as a shaper of tactics. Certainly, the American influence was significant; all material came from American supplies and in some stages of the war, at least, the Americans bore the brunt of the fighting. Combined operations were limited, with American and Korean forces generally having their own tactical sectors of responsibility. The Korean Army gained valuable fighting experience, certainly, but there had been little time to train the Koreans in U.S. combat methods. One author gives a more revealing account of perceptions:

Except for expediency. . . Korean officers had little reason to take the training they received with the seriousness they had taken the far more professional training Japan had given many of them. . . Japanese ranks and training remained the prestige system under light American veneer; a senior from Japanese days was regarded as a senior even when he happened to have entered the American service later and had lower rank.<sup>17</sup>

#### UNITED STATES MILITARY INFLUENCE

Yet, the Americans tried hard to mold an effective fighting force after the American model, and were successful. Generals MacArthur, Ridgway and Van Fleet placed enthusiastic support behind renewed training. American military advisors were increased to 746 in 1950, to 1,055 by mid-1951, and to 1,953 in early 1952.<sup>18</sup> By 1959, nearly ten percent of all Korean officers had some training in the United States. In addition, the American

population of 350,000 troops was larger than the entire state of Nevada's; the Koreans could not help but become "Americanized" to some extent.<sup>19</sup> The Army has been the only Korean group on which Americans have achieved effective influence, after decades of devoting funds, training, and attention.<sup>20</sup>

The same holds true today. Even with the proposed withdrawal of American forces, the Carter Administration approved a transfer of \$800 million of weapons to South Korean forces.<sup>21</sup> In addition to the effects of the continued American presence, combined exercises are often held to reinforce interoperability, such as "Team Spirit 78", held in March 1978, which involved U.S. troops from Japan, Hawaii, and CONUS,<sup>22</sup> including 30,000 American and 73,000 South Korean troops of all services.<sup>23</sup>

The single most important determining factor of Korean tactics has been the United States' influence. This is perhaps why it is so important to analyze the variances in our respective doctrines. It is far too easy to assume that the two are the same. The slight divergences, the intricacies occasioned by differences in outlook, such as the Japanese influence, are the factors which bear investigation.

One final characteristic has already been alluded to several times. The extreme attention to detail which is a part of everyday Korean planning, rather than being a hindrance to the effective execution of operations, is only a different concept. A description of this principle in action was well written by Lieutenant General William R. Peers:

I had never before had the opportunity of working with ROK forces. It took a degree of learning and understanding, but I found them to be highly efficient and a distinct pleasure on my part to work with. They are most deliberate and methodical in all of their operations. At the same time, however, once a course of action is determined, they are positive, aggressive and persistent. These somewhat contradictory statements may require an explanation. They were meticulous in developing intelligence of the enemy in the proposed area of operation and in preparing their plans. Sometimes this would take weeks or months, and even then the operation may be postponed. Once the necessary picture of the enemy situation is developed, the operation is initiated with maximum strength and most aggressively. On the US side, we made every effort to support their operations through the provision of additional helicopters, artillery, tanks and APC's. This not only assisted them in the operation, but also proved of immense value in developing co-operation with adjacent US units.<sup>24</sup>

#### SUMMARY

The primary influence on tactics, in the context of this chapter, has been the United States. Historical and sociological elements, while definitely influencing the development of tactics, have often contributed more to an operation, while using the same fundamentals, being different in execution on the ground. The Korean commander can, and does, expect unwavering obedience to his commands. His enforcement of discipline on the battlefield will be more physical, more direct, than the American's. He can expect his soldiers to drive forward in the face of danger with a strong degree of aggressiveness, loyalty, and speed. He can plan extended operations in the winter, at night, without immediately responsive supply lines. He will be well-prepared for an operation, and when he conducts it, it will be with ferocity and violence. In a tight situation, he might be expected to counterattack when an American force might continue to defend.



Being fervently endowed with an awareness of the immediate threat to his nation's existence, the Korean soldier, if instilled with the proper degree of "jungshin" hoped for by his superiors, will individually take great personal risks and help insure the success of an operation. Compared to a U.S. operations order which visualizes an attack through one or two "phases" of an operation, the Korean operations order will more likely order the concept of an operation from start to finish. More significantly, the operation will probably be executed from start to finish exactly as written.

END NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

<sup>1</sup>Republic of Korea, A History of the Korean People, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. 32-33.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Congress, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, (Washington: Data Management Division, Comptroller, DSAA: December 1977), p. 31.

<sup>4</sup>Major Kim Man Taek, Instructor, Korean Army College, in a welcome and orientation class given at the Army College, Chinhae, Korea, on March 17, 1979.

<sup>5</sup>Observations of the author while a student at the Korean Army College, 1978-1979.

<sup>6</sup>Gregory Henderson, Korea: Politics of the Vortex, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 73.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Pak Kyong-sik, "Koreans Forced to Enter the Pacific War", Rekishigaku kenkyu (Historical Research), No. 297, February 1965, pp. 30-46.

<sup>10</sup>Henderson, op. cit., p. 336.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 337.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 341.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 343.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 346.

<sup>16</sup>General Maxwell B. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1972), p. 36.

<sup>17</sup>Henderson, op. cit., p. 342.

<sup>18</sup>Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in War and Peace, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 178-179.

<sup>19</sup>Henderson, op. cit., p. 352.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 334.

<sup>21</sup>U.S. Congress, House International Relations Committee, Chronologies of Major Developments in Selected Areas of International Relations, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 238.

<sup>22</sup>U.S. Congress, Major Developments, op. cit., p. 238.

<sup>23</sup>SMSgt Harold Newcomb, "Team Spirit '78", Airman, 22, September 1978, p. 44.

<sup>24</sup>U.S. Army Adjutant General, Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 4th Infantry Division, I Field Force Vietnam Vietnam, Period 1967-1968, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 8.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### MILITARY SYMBOLOGY

All the examples of operations overlays to be used in succeeding chapters use some Korean symbology. This chapter demonstrates differences in U.S. and R.O.K. military symbology which can cause confusion in reading operations overlays and consequently in conducting combined operations.

Until 1978 most Korean symbols were the same as the American, including labels with American abbreviations, such as "FEBA" or "GOP". Problems with less-educated soldiers caused the R.O.K. Army to revert to Korean lettering. For example:

R.O.K. Symbol



U.S. Symbol



There are several differences in showing unit designations, partly due to the Korean regimental system and partly due to the Korean practice of omitting some parts of the designation on map symbols. First, Korean companies are numbered, not lettered:




U.S. Infantry Company



Korean Infantry Company

R.O.K. unit symbols show the designation of the unit and its immediate parent unit. U.S. Army symbols include all parent unit data, although it may sometimes be omitted. The example below is of a company of the 41st Field Artillery Battalion, 18th Field Artillery Brigade, 12th Corps:



U.S. Symbol





R.O.K. Symbol





The Korean Army uses a completely different designation system for enemy units from the one it uses for friendly units. The U.S. Army uses the same U.S. unit symbols for enemy units as it does for friendly units, except that we draw the symbol in red or in double lines. For example:

<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>R.O.K. Symbol</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>
Enemy Infantry Battalion.		

For some control measures, the South Korean Army uses different symbols (sometimes only slightly different), from the U.S. version.

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>R.O.K. Symbol</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>
Airborne Drop Zone.		
	Always rectangular.	Usually circular.

Some symbols are confusing to either R.O.K. or U.S. soldiers because one country has units or concepts which the other country does not use.

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>R.O.K. Symbol</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>
.50-Caliber Company (ADA Role).		No equivalent.
Airmobile Brigade.	No equivalent unit.	

For the most part, the R.O.K. Army uses U.S. military symbology. It is the small differences which can lead an officer of either Army to believe that he understands an operations overlay when he truly does not. Improper communications can waste lives.

See Appendix E, R.O.K. Army Operational Graphics, for a more detailed account and several examples of the differences in R.O.K. and U.S. military symbology.

CHAPTER FIVE  
CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS  
GENERAL: U.S. AND KOREAN TACTICS

U.S. Field Manual 100-5 lists five major types of offensive operations: the movement to contact, the hasty attack, the deliberate attack, the pursuit and the exploitation. In the movement to contact the unit moves on the battlefield with the least force possible, with the mission of developing the enemy situation and preventing unnecessary delay of the main body. When initial contact is made, the commander must make the decision to conduct a hasty attack or a deliberate attack. If an attack succeeds, exploitation and pursuit should ensue. In all cases, the commander maintains only those reserves necessary to insure flexibility and continued momentum. The Dictionary of United States Army Terms (AR 310-25) defines several other types of offensive actions, such as raids, feints, diversions, reconnaissance-in-force and demonstrations, but these are generally "limited-objective, limited-scale, or specially designed" operations which follow the fundamentals of the hasty and deliberate attacks.<sup>1</sup>

The South Korean Army teaches five forms of offensive operations: the movement to contact, reconnaissance-in-force, the coordinated attack, the exploitation (literally, "expansion of battle results"), and the pursuit. In all five forms of offense, there are four possible forms of maneuver: the penetration, the frontal attack, the envelopment, and circuitous movement.<sup>2</sup> The differences in tactical forms are apparent. The Koreans use

the coordinated attack and not the hasty attack; this is again reflective of the Korean penchant for planning. The reconnaissance-in-force, also, is considered a major form of attack operation, although it is specifically excluded as such in FM 100-5.

FM 100-5 states that the force should "use movement techniques designed to take advantage of the terrain, and to adapt to the likelihood of enemy contact."<sup>3</sup> The experienced military officer, however, will recognize the Korean forms of maneuver listed above as carry-overs from previous editions of the American FM 100-5 and FM 61-100. To a major extent, then, the initial observation can be made that the R.O.K. tactics are largely a reflection of American offensive operations during the last two decades.

In organizing for combat, one difference must be noted which is more or less a tautology, yet is significant to the application of combat power. South Korean forces seldom task-organize at battalion level, because there is a very small percentage of mobile forces which can be used to cross-attach. Accordingly, most operations are conceived of as pure infantry operations.

In planning or directing an operation, the American operations order format is used. One exception is that the operations order is always written at division level in the R.O.K. Army. It is generally said that the Korean Army uses flowery phraseology in their operations orders, and seldom states objectives and orders in concrete terms. Fortunately, this is not true. A sample of a Korean Army attack order is included at Appendix F, translated directly from the book, White Paper Tactics, which is a text designed to give "ideal" solutions to operations orders, mission analyses, and related actions for all forms of attack. The similarities to U.S. orders are more striking than are the differences.

A vital part of nearly every operations order is the "Infiltration Annex", which includes sections on "Infiltration Routes, Attack Positions, Link-up Sites, Fire Limitation Lines, and Organization of the Infiltrating Unit."<sup>4</sup>


#### THE COORDINATED ATTACK

Planning for the coordinated attack begins with the mission analysis. Task analysis includes the identification of specified tasks and implied tasks, culminating in the restated mission. There are always specified tasks at division level. Next, a terrain analysis is conducted. This procedure begins with the identification of key terrain, which is always high ground and never a city. An objective(s) are then assigned. Avenues of approach are then drawn on a map overlay. Each avenue crosses all key terrain along the route.

The rationale for this is that North Korean forces are terrain-oriented, and the South Korean Army believes that to be successful, all enemy must be destroyed in zone; consequently, a good avenue of approach must take friendly forces across as many enemy positions as possible. A sample terrain analysis is shown on the following page at Figure 2.



FIGURE 2: ATTACK TERRAIN ANALYSIS<sup>5</sup>



A division will normally conduct the attack with two regiments forward and one regiment in reserve, or "following." Intermediate objectives may be assigned to one or both attacking regiments. A main attack and a secondary attack are always designated in the operations order.

The striking difference between the Korean concept of the operation and the U.S. concept is the use of the "infiltration unit." The reserve regiment is normally tasked to provide a company-sized unit as the "special mission unit, ground infiltration." The infiltration unit moves to an objective, either by day or night, and provides fire support for the advancing main body. In addition, if detected, it serves a deception role, deceiving the enemy as to the time and location of the main attack.

The infiltration company is normally attached to the attacking regiment in closest proximity once the regiment has passed the company's location.

#### THE EXPLOITATION

The exploitation requires the most combat service support of all offensive operations, and the support must be responsive. The Korean Army recognizes only two opportunities for conducting the exploitation: the receipt of an order from higher authority to conduct the exploitation, or when the attacking unit has fully secured their objective and reached the "control line." To understand the concept of an exploitation, one must realize that the Korean corps normally attacks with two divisions, while one division follows the main attack. If the corps' main attack division conducts the exploitation, it will be joined by the corps' "following support" division, but will leave one regiment in reserve. If the corps' supporting attack division conducts the exploitation, it will conduct the action alone, leaving one battalion in reserve.

The object of the exploitation is to seize enemy artillery positions, signal facilities and command posts.<sup>6</sup>

The overall concept for the exploitation varies little between Korean and American doctrine, with one notable exception. Under the American concept, it is normal to use a previously uncommitted force to exploit.<sup>7</sup> Under the Korean concept, the following force (corps' reserve) is used to exploit, combined with the previously committed main attack division. In the case where the exploitation takes place from the secondary attack's sector, only the previously-committed force is used.

#### MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

The South Korean division, when planning for the movement to contact, differentiates between courses of action only in the avenue of approach to be utilized. In all cases, the operation is conducted with the division reconnaissance battalion used as a "covering force," followed by two regiments up and one regiment back.

In the movement to contact, the division does task organize. A typical organization for combat would be similar to that for an American operation, except that the organization would be noticeably light in tanks. Commonly, the operation is conducted with the light infantry division, which forms two "battle groups" or "regimental combat teams."<sup>8</sup> A typical regimental combat team might include an infantry regiment, a tank company or platoon, an artillery battalion (towed), an engineer company, and two transportation truck companies. The reserve regiment (occasionally a battalion) follows at a distance up to 40 kilometers behind the advancing regiments.<sup>9</sup>

The U.S. and R.O.K. concepts are not dissimilar, except in the nature of the forces used to conduct the operation. From the American point

of view, mobility and firepower well forward are the key to success of the movement to contact. It is difficult to imagine an entire division loaded in 2½-ton trucks, advancing to meet the enemy. Again, however, one must consider the Korean Army's degree of mobility and combat organization.

#### RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE

The Korean reconnaissance in force is conducted somewhat similarly to a movement to contact, except that each regiment provides one reinforced battalion to march to the regiment's front as a recon-in-force unit. The operation is normally conducted with two regiments forward and one following.<sup>10</sup>

The Korean concept differs from the American concept only in its classification. In its execution, it is merely a variant on the movement to contact, except that it is obviously more time-consuming. Whereas U.S. doctrine terms it a special operation, the R.O.K. Army considers the reconnaissance in force to be a separate form of operation.

#### PURSUIT

The purpose of Korean pursuit operations is the destruction of enemy forces; thus, the objective of a pursuit is the enemy unit. A review of Korean doctrine on this subject reveals no significant difference between U.S. and R.O.K. concepts. Again, however, a difference is apparent in that the pursuit would normally be conducted utilizing the light infantry division, a somewhat difficult concept considering that the North Korean forces are relatively tank-heavy. Additionally, since attack helicopters are controlled at Corps level and higher, the responsive combat power considered essential to an American pursuit operation is lacking.

## SPECIAL ATTACK OPERATIONS

Specific, or "special" operations conducted within the conventional scenario by R.O.K. forces include the night attack, cold weather operations, airmobile operations, river-crossing operations, mountain operations, and fortified area operations. The discussion of airmobile operations will be deferred until Chapter Eight.

### The Night Attack

The night attack is basically the same as that executed by the U.S. Army, with two exceptions. First, illumination is seldom used. A major criterion, which is rather puzzling, is whether the enemy has used illumination previously. Second, indirect fire support is seldom used, for fear of disclosing artillery or mortar positions by muzzle flash. The night attack, as is the day attack, is normally executed with two regiments forward, and one in reserve.<sup>11</sup> As a rule, seventy percent of R.O.K. Army tactical training is conducted at night.

### Cold Weather Operations

"Snow and Cold Terrain Operations" are considered a separate case by the R.O.K. Army, ostensibly because of Korea's bitter winter weather, and the emphasis on being constantly prepared to fight primarily on Korean soil. Special considerations include extended positioning of forces, increased use of railroads, increased use of lakes and marshes, and decreased use of night operations. Infantry would be fully utilized, and armor would be employed until the attainment of "ice critical" weather condition. Special training involves the use of both ski infantry units and bobsled infantry units.<sup>12</sup> The only major difference between American and Korean

cold weather operations, however, lies in degree of emphasis and training. All South Korean soldiers receive intensive, active training and experience. In addition, the relative inurement of the South Korean to the rigors of cold weather allows much greater initial utilization of the individual soldier in winter than the American soldier.

#### River-Crossing Operations

For the river-crossing operation, crossing sites of from 200 to 500 meters are selected. Both M4T6 floating bridges and ponton bridges are employed, supported from corps level. There are no significant differences between R.O.K.-U.S. tactics in this area, except for quantity and quality of river-crossing equipment used.

#### Mountain Operations (Mountain-Peak Operations)

Although mountain operations are, in the U.S. Army, basically the exclusive domain of Ranger and Special Forces units, the same operations are a common tactical matter in the South Korean Army, since much of the countryside is mountainous. Principle means of transport for mountain operations are impressed or paid laborers and packhorses. The 60mm mortar is used as the principle fire support weapon. Because of terrain obstruction, wire communications are used extensively. Whenever possible, the following scenario is used for a division attack in mountainous terrain. Two regiments attack, while one regiment remains in reserve. Each regiment attacks a separate designated hilltop. An air infiltration unit, normally a reinforced battalion, conducts either an airborne or airmobile assault onto an adjacent hilltop, to support the operation by fire.<sup>13</sup>

The main difference here with American tactics is the air infiltration unit, a concept not used in the U.S. Army for mountain operations. In addition, the Americans would seldom, if ever, commit regular infantry troops or a troop unit of this size to an attack in the mountains.

#### Fortified Area Operations

For attack of a fortified position, the infantry division receives the following attachments as a rule: a tank battalion, a field artillery battalion, a chemical company, a field engineer battalion, and miscellaneous combat service support elements. The operation is highly coordinated. A ground infiltration unit (battalion) secures an objective near the principal objective, to provide fire support and to block enemy reinforcements. Once this is accomplished, an airmobile battalion seizes an objective to the rear, to block enemy egress. Then, two regiments of the division conduct the main attack. The use of fire support is limited, to minimize friendly casualties.<sup>14</sup>

The unique characteristic of the South Korean operation is, obviously, the use of the infiltration units.

#### SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND KOREAN OFFENSIVE TACTICS

Although the development of South Korean offensive tactics closely parallels United States doctrine, there are significant differences which may hinder a combined operation. It may be argued that much of Korea's offensive doctrine is basically the same as that espoused by the U.S. in older versions of FM 61-100, yet the current differences must be recognized. Younger officers and NCOs trained in the latest U.S. doctrine most probably

have no conception whatsoever of what American tactics were in the past, nor are they aware of their application to the R.O.K. Army. In addition, the South Koreans have tailored all of these tactical techniques to the Korean soldier and the Korean terrain and weather.

As has been shown in this chapter, there are various definitional differences between the two nations' tactics. The hasty attack, for example, is not studied by the Korean Army officer.

Korean operations revolve around the infantry division. Mobility and firepower, compared to U.S. units, will be greatly inferior. The principal form of transportation used by the infantry division in the attack is the truck.

Additionally, task organization, as understood in the U.S., is a less significant factor in Korean planning.

The principal objective of the attack is the destruction of all enemy forces in zone, as well as the retention of key terrain. Since North Korean troops are expected to be disposed along key terrain, avenues of approach are selected to cross probable enemy objectives whenever possible. Enemy forces are seldom, if ever, bypassed for later "mop-up" action, as is allowed by U.S. doctrine.

Rather than employing the involved U.S. techniques for computing relative combat power, Korean attacks are "normally" conducted with the familiar "two up and one back" approach.

In the exploitation phase of an operation, the Korean corps normally exploits with committed units as well as uncommitted units, as opposed to the U.S. employment of uncommitted units only.



Mountain operations differ significantly from the corresponding U.S. tactics. Infantry units are employed, and pack horses are maintained in readiness for such operations. The use of an air infiltration unit by the R.O.K.s is also unique.

Fortified area operations, also, are distinguished by the use of air and ground infiltration units.

It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that the differences in modern Korean and American offensive tactics are significant. The actual impact of these differences will be discussed in Chapter Twelve.

END NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, Operations, FM 100-5, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 4-9 thru 4-12.

<sup>2</sup>Republic of Korea, Division Attack: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. 11.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Army, op. cit., p. 4-10.

<sup>4</sup>Republic of Korea, op. cit., pp. dahp 23-24.

<sup>5</sup>Republic of Korea, White Paper Tactics: Division Attack, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1975), p. 23.

<sup>6</sup>Korea, Division Attack, op. cit., pp. chong 8-9.

<sup>7</sup>U.S. Army, op. cit., p. 4-11.

<sup>8</sup>Korea, Division Attack, op. cit., pp. 47-59.

<sup>9</sup>Korea, White Paper, op. cit., p. 178.

<sup>10</sup>Korea, Division Attack, op. cit., pp. dahp 53-dahp 54.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 117-130 and p. dahp 101.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 131-138.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 201-217.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 221-236.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE TACTICS

Korean defensive tactics, as time progresses, will become increasingly divergent from U.S. tactics as the United States Army becomes fully indoctrinated in the active defense.\* The Korean concept of defense, although unique in its own right, was originally patterned after American defensive doctrine. As with the offense, the similarities will grow less distinct with time, as new generations of U.S. soldiers arise knowing modern (or future) tactics, but with little or no knowledge of past U.S. doctrine.

Nor does the Korean "failure" to adopt the active defense represent a lack of "progressiveness." The active defense was developed to meet today's ever-changing threat. The South Korean defense is designed to counter a "known" threat offensive technique, and there is little incentive to change one's tactical thinking because the Americans have changed theirs. This chapter first defines the U.S. active defense, then addresses the Korean forms of defense, concluding with a comparison of the two countries' doctrine.

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\*The active defense is stressed here to emphasize the greatest possible differences between U.S. and Korean tactics. U.S. doctrine still allows for the position defense by pure infantry forces, but the active defense is the primary U.S. type of defense. See FM 71-101 (now in final draft), FM 7-30 (being written), and FM 7-20 for the position defense. Although IX Corps in Japan, which has the contingency mission for Korea, consists of straight infantry divisions, I am assuming that some U.S. divisions which could be committed later during a Korean War would be mechanized.

## THE AMERICAN ACTIVE DEFENSE

Perhaps the greatest divergence from previous doctrine is the emphasis on force orientation of the active defense, contrasted to the form orientation of previous doctrine. No longer are "types" of defense specified. Also, rather than concentrating on key terrain and its retention, a unit now concentrates on destroying the enemy force.

On the modern battlefield, an American force must operate on extended frontages, defend outnumbered with austere forces, and fight on a highly lethal and mobile battlefield. We plan to face an enemy who uses combined arms formations, penetration tactics and a heavy concentration of artillery.

The active defense was designed to utilize wide frontages, allow forces to fight, outnumbered, a highly mobile enemy force, and provide for defense in depth. The active defense is force-oriented, but terrain utilization remains highly important. The purpose is to stop the enemy, so that we can go on the offense, i.e., "win the first battle."

The active defense may be defined as "target servicing." Corps through brigade-level units service enemy units, and battalion through platoons service enemy weapon systems.

Within the active defense, two alternatives may be employed. When the enemy situation is vague and most of the terrain is suitable for avenues of approach, a balanced defense is utilized. When there is good intelligence or when the terrain is so restrictive that it is relatively easy to identify avenues of approach, a weighted defense is employed. These terms do not reflect forms of defense; they merely indicate alternatives for the

positioning of units. The active defense is based on sound defensive tactics and fundamentals--not form. In short, the active defense is a common-sense approach to fighting the battle.

In the defense, the bulk of anti-armor weapons systems are located in the covering force, which has taken on greatly increased significance. The covering force actually fights a defensive battle in depth to inflict losses on enemy forces and to deceive the enemy as to the disposition of the forces in the area. The covering force does not conduct a delay; it fights a defensive battle.

Units in the main battle area most commonly receive non-restrictive missions, such as "defend in sector." The most common restrictive mission used is "retain", an order which does not mean to "hold key terrain." A mission to "retain Hill 1010" does not imply that a commander must physically occupy the hill, so long as he has the terrain under friendly control.

Reserves in the active defense will be small, perhaps a company at brigade level. Reserve force missions may include defense in depth, counter-attack by fire, limited objective counterattacks, obstacle construction or rear area security.

Although unit sectors are still used as control measures in the active defense, the battle position is more common. The concept of battle positions is that a force may be required to displace rapidly in response to an enemy threat or in response to a requirement to thicken the main battle area elsewhere. It is apparent from all the concepts of the active defense that a highly mobile force is critical to its accomplishment.<sup>1</sup>

## MAJOR SOUTH KOREAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS

The South Korean Army lacks the mobility and the long-range weapons to successfully adopt the active defense. Additionally, the terrain, particularly in the northern sector of the country, does not promise much success, unless one were to plan for intensive use of easily-interdictable roads. Accordingly, the Korean defense has been adapted to the Korean situation.

The two major forms of Korean defense are the area defense and the mobile defense. Special cases of the defense will be discussed separately below.

In deciding between the mobile and the area defense, the following factors are considered: enemy aviation, mobility, NBC, and firepower; the mission; terrain; available units, and time. In determining courses of action for the defense, the battle is mentally fought in several stages, with countermeasures developed for each of the several stages: The GOP battle, the FEBA battle, the enemy's penetration, friendly counterattack, anti-tank and anti-infiltration measures, and the rear area battle.<sup>2</sup>

The following control measures are required on the operations overlay:


1. Location of the GOP.
2. Location of the COP.
  - a. Checkpoints.
  - b. Contact points.
  - c. Link-up points.
3. The FEBA.

4. Unit sector boundaries.
5. Location of the command post.
6. Blocking positions. Only those under direct control of the issuing unit are normally depicted on the overlay.<sup>3</sup>

#### The Area Defense

The principles of the Korean area defense differ little from the former American concept. Again, though, as with the offense, the planning and assumptions will vary. The reader will recall from Chapter Two that the North Korean Army is terrain-oriented. Accordingly, when avenues of approach are analyzed, a two-step approach is employed. First, key terrain in the defense sector is identified. Each segment of key terrain is circled. Next, the most probable avenues leading across all key terrain are identified, and an analysis and comparison of the avenues are made. Such U.S. considerations as canalizing and hindering terrain are only considered during the final analysis. A sample terrain analysis is presented on the following page.

FIGURE 3  
DEFENSIVE TERRAIN ANALYSIS<sup>4</sup>



In numerous "school solutions" at the Korean Army College, it is routine to actually identify the key terrain first, and then to "draw in" avenues of approach which neatly fit the unit boundaries. The resultant solutions, then, leave some doubt concerning the depth of analysis employed.



In general, the area defense is terrain-oriented. An order to "hold key terrain" is common, as it recently was in U.S. doctrine, and as it still is in many NATO countries. Cross-attaching is seldom done, again for the reason that there is a shortage of armor. A Concept of the Operation from a typical South Korean defense order is presented below:

For this operation, the 34th Infantry Regiment in the east and the 35th Infantry Regiment in the West constitute the main defensive area, and in order to ensure control of the main defensive area, the 36th Infantry Regiment retains on-order operational control of the 4th Battalion, 34th Regiment, and acts as division reserve, as the division conducts an area defense. Initially the 36th Infantry Regiment (-)(Reinforced) composes the general outpost until 18 September, 20:30 hours, and delays the enemy forward of the FEBA for 24 hours or more, and after withdrawing from the GOP, becomes division reserve and gives priority to the 35th Infantry Regiment sector and prepares to be committed.

The division must secure the line from Hill 275-Hill 285-Hill 150-Hill 265. Should this prove impossible, we block the enemy forward of the line connecting Usungsang and Choongsung Mountain.<sup>5</sup>

The pattern for the area defense can be seen in this one short paragraph. The division normally defends with two regiments in the main battle area (main defense area) and with one regiment in the covering force ("GOP unit"), which fights a delaying action. Upon withdrawal from the GOP, the regiment becomes division reserve. A regimental-sized reserve is the rule for the defense. The reserve force may be used to reinforce a heavily-engaged regiment or may be used to counterattack. A counterattack annex is often attached to the operations order. The mission of "counterattack by fire" is not considered appropriate.

The orientation, again, is on the retention of terrain. The differences in the Korean area defense and the American active defense are so obvious that they need only be summarized. The size of the reserve

force and the method of utilizing it are different, and the U.S. Army's emphasis on enemy orientation is significantly different. The methods for analyzing enemy avenues of approach could very well cause disagreements in combined operations concerning optimum displacement of forces.

#### The Mobile Defense

Although the South Korean Army uses a matrix to determine whether to employ the area defense or the mobile defense, it is apparent that the mobile defense will generally be employed in whichever sector the R.O.K. Army's single mechanized division may be positioned. The mobile defense requires mechanized or armor forces.

When possible, cross-attachment of forces is utilized, but a system of reinforcing mechanized units with armored units is more common.

Whereas the objective of the area defense is to hold terrain, the purpose of the mobile defense is the "annihilation of enemy units." Both types of defense utilize the GOP as a security measure, but in the main battle area, the area defense utilizes the majority of the division's combat strength, whereas the mobile defense utilizes "minimum combat strength." Conversely, while a division commander would employ an "appropriate unit" as the reserve in the area defense, he would employ mechanized main force units as the reserve in a mobile defense. The purpose of the counterattack in the area defense is the restoration of the FEBA, while in the mobile defense it is the annihilation of the enemy.<sup>6</sup>

One divergence in U.S. vs. R.O.K. thought is noteworthy. In the description above, the word "annihilation" is chosen deliberately over the word "destruction." One aspect of Korean military thought, as enunciated

in the Korean "Fighting Man's Creed", is the "total annihilation of the North Korean puppet forces". . . "down to the last man." American thought, on the other hand, seldom brings the fighting down to such a personal level.

In the mobile defense, a counterattack plan is essential. A plan and overlay are prepared at division level, but a "detailed counterattack plan" is prepared only at Corps level and higher. A sample concept of the operation is presented below.

For this operation, 1st Brigade in the west and 2d Brigade in the east form the main defensive area, and with the 3d Brigade in reserve, division conducts a mobile defense. 1st and 2d Brigades block the enemy's attack, and the 3d Brigade, as division reserve, executes a counterattack to annihilate enemy units in the mouth of the penetration. Initially the 3d Brigade is organized as a task force ('special mission unit') and is utilized as the covering force, and after withdrawing on order, becomes division reserve. The division, in order to conduct the counterattack, must secure the line connecting Hill C-Hill D-Hill E-Hill F, and if it becomes impossible to accomplish the defense mission in the first forward defense area, must block the enemy forward of the line connecting Hill A and Hill B.<sup>7</sup>

Key points of this paragraph are that the mechanized division is organized into brigades instead of regiments, but more significantly the concept of the operation violates most of the principles of the mobile defense enunciated earlier, which were extracted from the same chapter of the same book! The major difference between this concept of the operation and the one presented for the area defense is that the units are mechanized, and the reserve unit will conduct a counterattack, rather than having a counterattack as one of their possible missions. In all the mobile defense scenarios in instructional material at the Korean Army College, the

concept of the operation is the same in principle. Rather than assuming that the R.O.K. Army does not "know how" to conduct a mobile defense, however, it is more realistic to assume that the concept represents the Korean version of the former U.S. mobile defense.

It was mentioned earlier that the mobile defense is basically restricted to the few mechanized units in the Korean Army; however, R.O.K. tactical doctrine does allow for conduct of the mobile defense by the infantry division. The infantry division might conduct a "mobile defense" as follows. In the textbook example below, a tank battalion has been attached to an infantry division. The tank battalion is designated as division reserve, along with one of the infantry regiments. One tank company is attached to the covering force, and detached when the GOP mission is complete. One tank company is attached to a front-line regiment, except that one platoon is attached to the other front-line regiment. The advantages of attaching a tank platoon to an infantry regiment will not be debated here. In this scenario, there are no transportation companies either attached or organic. Paragraph 3a of the operations order reads as follows:

This operation is a mobile defense with 31st Infantry Regiment (-1) in the west, and 32d Infantry Regiment in the east forming the forward defense area, and the 33d Infantry Regiment (-1) and 5th Tank Battalion in reserve.

Initially, from the reserve, the 33d Infantry Regiment (-1) (Reinf) serves as the GOP, and on order, after withdrawing from the GOP, becomes division reserve.

31st Infantry Regiment (-1) secures its assigned sector and 32d Infantry Regiment, while blocking the enemy's attack along the area bordering Highway 51, guards the area designated for the division counterattack and secures various areas along the sector.

33d Infantry Regiment (-1), in order to destroy enemy units in the mouth of the penetration, as division reserve conducts a counterattack, and gives priority to the 32d Infantry Regiment's sector, and will be committed.

Division must secure the line connecting Hill 140, Hill 135, Hill 130 and Hill 120, and in case the mission of defending in the forward defense area becomes impossible to accomplish, must block the enemy forward of the line connecting Hill 210, Hill 215 and Hill 220.<sup>8</sup>

It is difficult to address this concept of the operation without making some value judgments. First, it is hard to imagine a dismounted infantry regiment (albeit reinforced with tanks) conducting a covering force operation, conducting a passage of lines, withdrawing through another ten to fifteen kilometers of the main battle area, then conducting a counterattack against a possibly mobile force. The entire conceptualization of the mobile defense demands a mounted force capable of fast reaction, and at least possessing the same degree of mobility as the enemy force.

Regardless of the plausibility of the mobile defense conducted by dismounted infantry, however, it is a part of South Korean tactical doctrine. The difference between this operation and American tactics is easily stated. There is no such corresponding tactic in American Army doctrine.

As a closing point to this section, however, a major difference in expression in Korean operations orders is apparent in the preceding three order extracts. The Korean defense order specifically uses terminology to address an alternate course of action to be used should the accomplishment of the original order become "impossible". The terminology would be considered "defeatist" in American terms, and would not be used. For morale

reasons, also, the identification in words of the main attack and the supporting attack in an offense operations order is not done in the United States Army, although it is the rule in the corresponding R.O.K. Army order.

#### SPECIAL FORMS OF DEFENSE

##### The Mountain Defense


Although considered a separate form of defense, the mountain defense is actually a form of area or position defense conducted in mountainous terrain. The R.O.K. Army feels that the mountain defense is advantageous in many circumstances because, while they are able to fire indirect-fire weapons with a consistent degree of accuracy, an attacking enemy cannot use indirect fires effectively. In particular, if strongpoints are prepared beforehand, even attack aircraft and attack helicopters would be relatively ineffective. A mountain is also difficult to attack on foot. In addition, in a division defense, it is difficult for the enemy to locate and attack the "rear" elements.<sup>9</sup>

Prerequisites for success of the mountain defense are coordinated long-distance security and effective indirect-defense fires, bringing the enemy into close combat, and a rapid counterattack.<sup>10</sup>

In developing courses of action for the mountain defense, one or two peaks are chosen to defend. Avenues of approach leading to the mountain peaks are then selected, and battalions are allocated to each avenue of approach. These battalions defend approximately fifteen kilometers forward (and down) from the peak. A smaller number of battalions defend approximately five kilometers from the peak, and a counterattack force, sometimes

reinforced with tanks, provides the final defense. With the exception of unit dispositions, the principles of the defense become basically the same as the area defense, since the friendly forces hold key terrain, and the reserve regiment may also be used to thicken units in contact. In Figure 4, below, a division is defending Hills 749 and 995.

FIGURE 4  
OVERLAY FOR THE MOUNTAIN DEFENSE<sup>11</sup>



Since this operation is a separate operation entirely, in comparison to U.S. tactics, little room is left for discussion. Suffice it to say that

a reasonable American commander would take the Korean mountains into consideration for planning a defense, but he should also be aware that a neighboring R.O.K. unit will probably be trained in specific aspects of the undertaking.

#### The Broad-Front Defense

The broad-front defense is, of course, a type of defense assumed when the division is compelled to defend on a wider front than usual. Additionally, it may be deliberately adopted when the enemy situation is vague or when the enemy force is assumed to be armor-heavy. Since the friendly force will be primarily infantry, this type of defense relies on maximum dispersal of troops and maximum utilization of long-range anti-armor weapons, primarily the TOW. The key element in planning for this operation is the formulation of a detailed anti tank-attack plan. In other aspects, however, such as in the operations order, it is referred to as an area defense. As such, it does not require detailed analysis, but should be treated as a separate case of the area defense.<sup>12</sup>

#### Other Special Cases

Other forms of defense which are considered special cases by the South Korean Army are the isolated defense, the all-around defense, the defense-to-the end, and the perimeter defense. Because these are special cases and because they correspond almost directly with special cases in the United States Army, they will be addressed only briefly here.

The isolated defense occurs when a unit is separated from its parent unit. The corresponding tactics are similar to the American tactics called "Breakout of Encircled Forces."



The perimeter defense is generally a small-unit tactic, essentially the same as the U.S. use in Vietnam.

The all-around defense is not to be confused with the principle which states that a good defense provides for all-around defense and defense in depth. Rather, the all-around defense, as a special case, is used when the flank situation is unclear. In this case, subordinate commanders are simply given more freedom of action to maneuver forces and to re-orient blocking positions.

The defense-to-the-end is rather unique. Rather than being a fight to the last man against overwhelming odds, as the name would imply, the defense-to-the-end is designed to hold a vital position, which cannot be relinquished. The goal is to build a strong defense, sufficient to destroy the enemy. The Korean force is to fight tenaciously, with renewed vigor (jungshin) to kill all the invading forces. A withdrawal is forbidden, so in some cases, a fight to the death may indeed be the result.

#### SUMMARY OF TACTICAL DIFFERENCES

Most of the differences in Korean and American defense tactics revolve around the fact that Korea has not adopted the active defense. Consequently, R.O.K. forces fight a terrain-oriented battle, whereas U.S. troops fight a force-oriented battle. There are great differences in the level of mobility of U.S. vis-a-vis Korean combat units in general, but considering the composition of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division, these differences would be minimized in the event of hostilities in Korea.

Nevertheless, the major difference in goal orientation in the defense could lead to severe boundary problems if the U.S. division were to

fight a defense side-by-side with a Korean division. With the Koreans determined to fight to hold key terrain, the main force would be expected to be in a static position for an extended period of time. At the same time, the Americans might be moving to new defensive positions, and a severe gap could be created in control of the battle. Equally unacceptable, Korean troops not familiar with the active defense could perceive the American forces as withdrawing, and panic could ensue.

The Korean procedures for analyzing avenues of approach and developing courses of action are quite dissimilar from the American approach. This factor would have minimum impact on combat operations, but would probably cause misunderstanding and disagreement among R.O.K. and U.S. officers planning combined operations.

Concurrent with the change in American tactics, the Korean force now uses a relatively larger reserve force, both for the area and the mobile defense. This factor has no impact on combined operations.

The mobile defense using a mobile forces is nearly identical to the previous U.S. concept, the only significant difference being the emphasis on annihilation of the enemy. There is no U.S. doctrine for the mobile defense using dismounted infantry.

The mountain defense, as conceived by the R.O.K. Army, may or may not be the same as U.S. forces may fight. As a separate form of defense, it is a unique case when compared to American doctrine.

The other remaining forms of defense or special cases pose no problems to combined operations, except that it would be difficult to persuade an American unit cross-attached to a Korean division to

willingly participate in the defense-to-the-end. Since this is a unique operation, however, it seems unlikely that a Korean commander would even consider issuing such an order to a division comprised partly of foreign troops.

END NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

<sup>1</sup>From personal notes taken in P313, Forward Deployed Forces-I, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS., November 1979.

<sup>2</sup>Republic of Korea, Duties of the Operations Officer: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. 129.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 138-139.

<sup>4</sup>Republic of Korea, White Paper Tactics: Division Defense, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. 25.

<sup>5</sup>Korea, Operations Officer, op. cit., Overlay 4 (Inclosure).

<sup>6</sup>Korea, White Paper, op. cit., p. 161.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 170.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 208-209.

<sup>9</sup>Republic of Korea, Division Defense: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. chong 24.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. chong 23.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. dahp 92.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 139-155 and pp. chong 23-24.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 159-165.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Although the airborne capability of the Republic of Korea Army is limited, the Army does plan and train for airborne assaults. Airborne units do exist, yet they are dependent upon U.S. tactical airlift support, since the Korean Air Force has concentrated on the acquisition of fighter-bomber aircraft. One might claim that differences in R.O.K. and U.S. airborne operations are a moot point, since there are no U.S. airborne units in Korea. In the event of war, however, U.S. airborne units would probably be a part of our committed forces.

#### SIMILARITIES BETWEEN R.O.K. AND U.S. OPERATIONS

Unlike normal offensive and defensive operations, airborne operations are a category in which doctrine has been borrowed largely from American concepts.

Airborne operations are joint operations; support by the Air Force is essential. Within the Republic of Korea, the command mechanism for coordinating airborne operations is the R.O.K./U.S. Combined Forces Command. Logistical and transport support, as well as U.S. doctrinal assistance, enhance the interoperability of these operations.

Both nations use a similar coordination system, composed of an Army Airground Operations System and a Tactical Airforce Control System. The Army system is composed of a departure airfield control group and an arrival airfield control group. The Tactical Airforce Control System consists of an airlift control element, an air forces combat control team, and the Army assault team.

The planning system and procedures are essentially the same in both countries. Both Armies develop a marshaling plan, an air movement plan, a landing plan and a ground tactical plan. The same considerations are used in selecting drop zones. The purpose of conducting the airborne assault is the same. There are few differences in either combat support or combat service support planning or execution.

#### DIFFERENCES BETWEEN R.O.K. AND U.S. OPERATIONS

The first difference is minor and appears in the planning phase. U.S. doctrine calls for an "ideal" drop zone to be at least 2720 meters in length, to allow for dropping a full load of personnel from both doors of a C-130.<sup>1</sup> Shorter drop zones are accommodated, of course, by making more passes to discharge personnel. The Korean method of selecting drop zones is to locate rectangular strips of suitable land, which are 0.5-1 kilometer wide and 1 - 2 kilometers long.<sup>2</sup>


U.S. airborne operations are often undertaken to secure terrain for later landings by airmobile units or an air cavalry combat brigade. Because of the paucity of such units in Korea, the airborne operation is more often conceived as a separate action, with its own immediate objectives, although link-up with another unit is usually executed after the objectives have been secured.

Since large-equipment airlift capacity is limited, armor units will seldom be used; hence, the Korean airborne operation is primarily a light infantry tactic.

Differences in the ground tactical phase can best be observed by showing a sample operations overlay for a U.S. and a Korean assault. It

is important to remember that each of these figures are representative of operations, and not intended to represent an ideal solution for a general case.

FIGURE 5  
SAMPLE U.S. ARMY AIRBORNE OPERATION<sup>3</sup>




In the operation depicted in Figure 5, the U.S. 102d Airborne Division conducts a parachute assault with the 2d Brigade as the Phase I assault echelon. The 2d Brigade, with 1-16 Armor (-) attached, secures Objectives A, B, C and D, establishes anti-armor defenses, and secures

areas for aviation elements. In Phase II, the 3d Brigade conducts a parachute assault and assumes responsibility for Objectives C and D. A field artillery battalion is a part of each assault echelon. An air cavalry squadron (-) provides reconnaissance and security. 1-16 Armor (-) becomes division reserve on order, with each brigade providing one company for attachment to the armor battalion for the reserve mission.<sup>4</sup>

Doctrinally, the reserve may consist of elements of the armor battalion, airborne infantry, and attached helicopters.<sup>5</sup>

Attachments to a brigade for an airborne assault normally include one 105-millimeter howitzer battalion, an engineer company, a medical company, a forward area signal center platoon, an MP platoon, a detachment from the QM airdrop equipment support company, and tactical air control parties.<sup>6</sup>





For the R.O.K. Army operation, three regiments comprise the assault forces. Attachments to each regiment include a field artillery battalion (105, towed), an engineer company and four tactical air control parties. A battalion of the 32d Regiment is the division reserve. Division troops include the engineer battalion (-), a helicopter battalion, an armored reconnaissance battalion (4 platoons per company), and one TACP.

To understand the differences in concepts, one must understand the differences in diagramming. See Appendix G for a detailed explanation of Figure 6.

Rather than assigning the security mission to the air cavalry, the division's organic armored reconnaissance battalion performs the mission. This is the result of a difference in organization, there being no air cavalry in the R.O.K. division.

#### SUMMARY OF TACTICAL DIFFERENCES

Of the tactics discussed so far, airborne operations constitute the form which poses the fewest problems to combined operations. The differences demonstrated in the preceding discussion are relatively insignificant, revolving more around command and control than the tactical form itself.

The Korean division carries considerably less combat support with it. Signal, quartermaster and military police units are left in the division rear. The infantry is expected to be self-sufficient and prepared to react quickly to other situations. Tank units are not normally a part of the airborne operation.

Planning at the Korean division level is more detailed than the U.S. equivalent, (See Appendix G). Reconnaissance platoon sectors, and even anti-tank positions and observation posts are assigned at division level.

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WARTIME INTEROPERABILITY PROBLEMS POSED BY DIFFERENCES IN SOUTH--ETC(U)  
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
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
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END NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, PT 57-1: Joint Airborne Planning, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1978), p. 4-4.

<sup>2</sup>Republic of Korea, Airborne and Counter-Airborne Operations: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. 24.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Army, op. cit., p. C-1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. C-1-1.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 5-5.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Republic of Korea, op. cit., p. 28.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

Since Korean airmobile operations are similar to American airmobile operations, this chapter presents only highlights of each country's tactics, concluding with a comparison.

#### AMERICAN AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

An airmobile operation is one in which combat forces maneuver about the battlefield in helicopters under the control of a ground force commander, to engage in combat on the ground. An operation in which the helicopters are used merely to transport a combat force to a staging area is an air movement.<sup>1</sup> Depending on the type of division, aviation lift assets vary. The aviation battalion organic to the infantry and airborne divisions has sufficient assets to airlift the assault elements of two rifle companies in one lift. The aviation group organic to the air assault division can lift the assault elements of two infantry battalions and three 105-mm. howitzer batteries at one time. As a minimum, a battalion-sized assault force must be provided sufficient lift assets for the assault elements of one rifle company and its share of combat support elements in one lift.<sup>2</sup>

The airmobile or air assault division has combat support elements tailored to its specialized mission, including an air assault Vulcan gun battalion, engineer battalion, air cavalry squadron, division artillery, target acquisition battery and aviation group.<sup>3</sup>

In providing combat support elements to the task force commander, operational control is the normal command relationship. Attachment of units to an assault force is appropriate only when their parent units

cannot provide the required degree of command, administrative and logistics functions. Attachment of artillery units, however, is a frequent occurrence.<sup>4</sup>

Providing a force with the airmobile option does not materially change the types of offensive, defensive and retrograde operations which can be accomplished by a ground force. The speed, surprise and flexibility of airmobile operations enhance the ability to conduct any operation.<sup>5</sup>

With the exception of the air assault division, air assault forces are generally battalion-size or smaller. Because of its size and light weaponry, the air assault force cannot defend terrain for extended periods of time, so it is best suited for the offense.<sup>6</sup> Offensive airmobile operations include the movement to contact, reconnaissance in force, coordinated attack, exploitation and pursuit. The airmobile force is particularly well suited to execute the envelopment form of maneuver.<sup>7</sup>

The first plan developed for an operation is the ground tactical plan, which is the key to the execution of the operation. Most of the time, the air assault force's mission is oriented on the enemy, with neither a specified nor implied task to hold terrain. The commander is normally assigned a tactical area of operations (TAOR) which he may further subdivide. Common graphic control devices are the airhead line and the area of operations.<sup>8</sup>

Rather than specifying a particular size of unit for the reserve, current U.S. doctrine calls for an enemy-oriented reserve concept. Each unit is given a be-prepared mission to act as the reserve, and if required, the least-committed unit becomes the reserve.<sup>9</sup>

## KOREAN AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

The Korean Army has no airmobile or air assault divisions, and airmobile assaults are not considered a division-level operation. The reader will recall from Chapter Five that in conjunction with a division attack, both air and ground infiltration objectives are usually assigned. The air infiltration unit, usually a reinforced infantry battalion, is the Korean air assault unit.


The airmobile operation is conceived as being suitable only when there is a reasonably strong degree of intelligence concerning enemy dispositions. Because of the capabilities of airmobility, it is desirable to utilize this form for the attack and control of deep objectives, later reinforcing the executing unit in a link-up operation.<sup>10</sup>

Sufficient helicopters for a battalion airlift are not organic to the division; the corps may place two UH-1H companies and one CH-47 company in direct support of a division which decides to incorporate an airmobile assault into an offensive action. A typical task force, designated by division, might include an infantry battalion, a company from the division reconnaissance battalion, a 106-millimeter recoilless rifle platoon and 4.2 inch mortar platoon from a regimental combat support company, an engineer platoon and a TACP section.<sup>11</sup>

The objectives for the airmobile assault are designated on the division operations overlay as numbered "air infiltration unit objectives."



FIGURE 7



In this overlay, the objectives are numbered; landing zones are lettered circles. Three companies assault while one company remains in reserve. Although the mortar and anti-tank platoons do not appear on the overlay, they are normally co-located with the task force command post.

The reconnaissance company, although by TOE an armored unit, dismounts for this operation, and concentrates its efforts on the most dangerous enemy avenue of approach. The overlay depicts one reconnaissance platoon initially providing security, to be joined later by the remainder of the company. In this example operation, although the recon units did not bring their vehicles, the  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton recoilless rifle vehicles were transported.

The G-3 chooses the landing zones for their terrain characteristics, and so that they form a half-ring around the company objectives, to facilitate the assault. Each company assaults its objective from two or three directions. Each platoon leader is well-rehearsed prior to the operation, and may attack the objective independently. Once the objectives are secured, each unit sends elements forward to man the outposts. The battalion then conducts a perimeter defense until link-up is effected.

Fire support is accomplished by the 4.2 inch mortars. The operation is often conducted out of range of division artillery. Attack helicopters will normally be committed to the division's main attack, not to the air-mobile assault.<sup>13</sup>

#### COMPARISON OF U.S. AND KOREAN OPERATIONS

Although the Republic of Korea has no air assault divisions, both the U.S. and Korean Army employ battalion-sized assaults in the infantry division. The planning process for both Armies is essentially the same.

There is a significant difference in the quantity of air lift assets available to the divisions. The American infantry division has an organic aviation battalion, which can provide airlift to support a battalion air assault, one company at a time. The Korean infantry division, with its aviation detachment, is not self-sufficient and must rely on support from the corps. Assuming that the corps can continue to provide air support, this problem is not serious.

The Korean Army does not have the tailored combat support units of the air assault division, but relies on employing standard combat support units. A difference between the respective infantry divisions is in the

use of attack helicopters. These weapons are a standard consideration in U.S. airmobile operations, but their shortage in the Korean Army makes their employment an exception.

In American doctrine, the assault force may conduct offensive, defensive or retrograde operations. The South Korean Army views the airmobile assault as strictly an offensive operation. In the Korean Army, rather than being a special form of the offense, the airmobile assault is often an automatic portion of every offensive action.

The U.S. Army's choice of reserves is dependent on the enemy situation. The Korean Army prescribes a company or a company minus as the reserve force for every battalion operation.

The mission assigned to the U.S. assault force is enemy-oriented. When an area of operations is used, there is no mission to hold terrain, except in special circumstances. The R.O.K. commander is always assigned a terrain objective, under the theory that holding the terrain will ensure the defeat of the enemy force.

Graphic control measures are also different, and could cause some misinterpretation in combined operations. The U.S. Army uses either an airhead line or an area of operations (AO). The R.O.K. Army uses the airhead line exclusively, as shown in Figure 7, except that it is called an area of responsibility.

All of the tactical differences mentioned here are of the type which could cause some confusion, but few are significant enough to cause any severe problems in combined operations.

END NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army. Concept Paper #22: Airmobile Operations--Tactics, Techniques, Control Measures. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>U.S. Army, PT 67-1: Fundamentals of Airmobile Operations, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), pp. 42-53.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Army, Concept, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 11-17.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>10</sup>Republic of Korea, Division Attack: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. 144.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 149.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., Chapter 11, Section 3, Overlay 11 (issued separately).

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 149-157 and dahp 107-110.

## CHAPTER NINE

### AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Although the author's original belief was that there were several major differences between U.S. and South Korean amphibious tactical doctrines, a comprehensive review of several documents<sup>1</sup> shows that the Korean doctrine is precisely the same as the American. Amphibious doctrine is promulgated at the Marine Corps Staff College in Chinhae, Korea, primarily by graduates of the U.S. course at Quantico, Virginia.

As in the U.S., either joint Navy-Marine or Navy-Army task forces conduct amphibious assaults.\* The purposes of the operation, the equipment employed, the graphic control measures used, and all the concepts of fire support and air support are identical to United States doctrine.

Only one problem exists. Since many terms unique to amphibious operations have no equivalents in the Korean language, related terms have been adopted. Even a person considered fluent in the Korean language, then, unless he had a perfect knowledge of amphibious operations, could produce some gross mistranslations. Appendix E lists several important terms and gives the English translation of the corresponding Korean term, as well as the spelling in the Korean alphabet.

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\*The Korean Marines are called the Navy Marine Corps.

END NOTE TO CHAPTER NINE

<sup>1</sup>Review was conducted of the following books:

Republic of Korea, Amphibious and Counter-Amphibious Operations: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978).

U.S. Army, PT 6-1: Principles of Joint Amphibious Operations, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1977).

U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 6-1: Marine Division, (Washington: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1974).

U.S. Marine Corps, ECP 3-4: Amphibious Ships, Landing Craft and Vehicles, (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Development and Education Command, 1973).

## CHAPTER TEN

### UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

Nearly thirty years of infiltration and armed incursions by spies, saboteurs and assassins have ingrained a particular Korean interest and expertise in unconventional warfare which in many ways surpasses American knowledge.

The Koreans learned many techniques in Vietnam, but Vietnam-type doctrine is not sufficient for the Korean Peninsula. South Korea, of course, has no armed insurgents, and the population is fanatically opposed to Communism and to North Korea. Yet constant infiltration by the North is sufficient to warrant constant vigilance and sharpening of counter-measures.

North Korea has large-scale, highly-trained guerrilla units, elements of which apparently conduct real-life operations as a training vehicle. Unconventional operations are also integrated into North Korean conventional tactics.

This chapter presents R.O.K. unconventional warfare (UW) tactics and unconventional warfare counter-operations, to be referred to in this chapter by the Korean term, "counter-unconventional warfare operations."

Special attention is devoted to counterinfiltration techniques, a category of operations more complex and more complete in doctrine than any U.S. equivalent.


## COMMAND SYSTEM AND CONCEPT OF UW

Unconventional warfare (UW) is one category of special warfare, the other two categories being counter unconventional warfare and psychological warfare.<sup>1</sup> The principal UW battleground is the enemy's rear area, where friendly forces may organize resistance movements and conduct guerrilla warfare, subversion or commando operations.<sup>2</sup>

The R.O.K. command system for UW operations is shown below.

FIGURE 8

COMMAND SYSTEM FOR R.O.K. UW OPERATIONS<sup>3</sup>





## GUERRILLA WARFARE

Guerrilla warfare may be accomplished in enemy territory or in friendly territory controlled by the enemy.<sup>4</sup> The South Korean Army sees the exploitable weaknesses of the North Koreans as predictable behavior, a lack of flexibility and easy disclosure of troop locations.<sup>5</sup> The methods employed by the R.O.K. include surprise attacks, ambush, denial operations and deception.<sup>6</sup>

Destruction of tactical targets is the primary objective of R.O.K. guerrilla warfare. Tactical control measures for such an operation include an objective, an assembly area, movement routes, mission support points (MSP), and optional measures such as a line of departure. An operation may coincide with a division attack (Figure 9) or may take place in isolation (Figure 10).

FIGURE 9

GUERRILLA MISSION WITH A DIVISION: R.O.K. OVERLAY<sup>7</sup>





FIGURE 10

GUERRILLA MISSION IN ISOLATION: R.O.K. OVERLAY<sup>8</sup>



COMMANDO OPERATIONS

Whereas guerrilla operations are inhabitant-oriented, use bases in enemy-occupied territory and rely on both internal and external support, R.O.K. commando operations use conventional units for single strikes rather than extended activities, employ bases in friendly territory, and are self-supporting. In addition to strategic and tactical strikes against targets, commandos may conduct reconnaissance, security and blocking missions for a division.<sup>9</sup>

#### USE OF UW UNITS DURING CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

Although UW activities may take place in a guerrilla environment, planning in the Korean Army also uses UW units as part of larger conventional operations. In this case, the capabilities of a UW force include direct and indirect guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion assistance, limited destruction of targets by explosives, commando operations and limited conventional or counter guerrilla operations. UW units may be employed to secure key terrain, guard a division rear area, or gather intelligence.

In the division attack, UW forces may assault the enemy's rear or secure bridges while the main force conducts the penetration. In the defense, they may attack the enemy's rear or conduct feints and demonstrations.<sup>10</sup>

Korean UW forces are infiltrated by land, sea or air, or may be left behind secretly by a larger force. This latter procedure is not to be confused with the U.S. detachment-left-in-contact (DLIC), since the unit is not there to perform an immediate combat action.<sup>11</sup>

UW units are normally retained under corps or field army control. For example, a corps may receive attachment of a battalion from a Special Warfare Brigade. The Corps G-3 then selects the operational area and the method of infiltration for the battalion. During the exploitation, the corps may assign operational control of the unit to an exploiting division, where they will often be used to block enemy reinforcement routes.<sup>12</sup>

The doctrine presented above is similar to U.S. doctrine, except that R.O.K. UW units are used more often in conventional-type missions.<sup>13</sup> The Korean UW unit is similar to any U.S. Special Forces unit; in fact, the terms "A Team" and "B Team" are used. The employment of these units, however, more closely resembles that of U.S. Ranger units.<sup>14</sup>

Korean UW operations are unique in their orientation. Although the R.O.K. Army gained experience in Vietnam, their training efforts are entirely oriented toward North Korea. The assumption that the R.O.K.'s next battles will be fought on Korean terrain have caused them to develop detailed UW plans suited to the immediate situation. The R.O.K.'s have a higher degree of expertise in UW operations than U.S. forces, but there is no significant difference between R.O.K. and U.S. tactics.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Korean psychological operations, including psychological warfare, directly reflect U.S. doctrine; most field manuals and training literature on the subject are translations of U.S. material. The R.O.K. Army employs basically the same methods of delivery, types of propaganda and goals. The Korean government uses extensive counterpropaganda; billboards and signs are thick throughout the country. A peculiar penchant in many of these is the use of graphic paintings of blood-spattered North Koreans being bayoneted or shot by victorious Southern soldiers.

A sample South Korean propaganda leaflet for wartime use is reproduced below.

Our national forces attack with superior strength and firepower anytime we desire. We possess aircraft, tanks, every caliber of artillery, and the newest style bombs and ammunition in great quantity, and are able to use as much as we want.

Your masters, even while recklessly conducting an immoral war designed to fulfill their greed, are covering up their incompetence and lack of resources with your lives. It is not necessary to make a present of your precious lives to your Communist masters. In order to live together with your parents and loving wives, as well as your precious children, you must save your lives!

This minute, the national forces' guerrilla units are occupying your rear area, and resistance is futile. You can live if you surrender. Many of your soldiers have found life by surrendering to the national forces. The national forces respect human life. Indicate surrender by raising both hands over your head, then show this leaflet to the national forces.

The national soldiers will welcome those of you bearing this leaflet, and will guide you to a safe place. Then you will find life and will be able to return to your parents and family.<sup>15</sup>

This text in English sounds simplistic, but the nuances of the Korean language make it somewhat eloquent in Korean. Even the use of the term "national forces" has connotations of the "true sovereignty" of South Korea, patriotism, and reunification which cannot be rendered in English. The proper use of high and low forms of address and verb forms also allows meanings which cannot be duplicated in English.


The point here is that the Korean Army is well-trained and experienced in PSYOPS and can prepare messages which only the most skilled American linguist could duplicate, and then only if he were fully immersed in the culture as well. Even then, a Korean officer could do a better job.<sup>16</sup> This is one area better left alone; the R.O.K. Army can accomplish this mission well.

#### COUNTER-UW OPERATIONS: GENERAL

Counter-unconventional warfare (counter-UW) is defined by the R.O.K. Army as "operations within an assigned area of responsibility employing every available means and method to protect against, prevent, destroy and mop-up the enemy's militarily and non-militarily constituted unconventional warfare, using as a foundation the objectively executed unified endeavors of every person within each military district."<sup>17</sup> The Korean Army's counter-UW system is as shown in Figure 11, on the following page.

FIGURE 11

R.O.K. COUNTER-UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE SYSTEM<sup>18</sup>



General planning matters and characteristics of military counter-UW operations parallel those of the U.S. Army. Participating in military operations are the armed forces, the police and the Homeland Reserve Forces. It is important to note that the Homeland Reserve Forces (HRF) are not the same as, for example, the U.S. National Guard. The HRF has more localized missions and has units at even village level, composed of local people. During alerts and infiltration notices, HRF units are also placed on full alert. In addition to their reserve mission, they constantly perform services for the Army in intelligence acquisition, terrain analysis and local security.<sup>19</sup>

The operational chain of command, formalized in a written cooperative agreement, includes the military, government officials and civilian officials.<sup>20</sup> Even in peacetime, an active Intelligence Center, composed of all three elements, is in operation. Its functions include analysis and correction of weaknesses within respective areas, the provision of timely intelligence to military units, formulation of the anti-aircraft intelligence plan, interrogation of prisoners for area-specific information, and determination of electronic support priorities for military districts.<sup>21</sup>


#### Counter guerrilla Operations

Counter guerrilla operations are sub-divided into strike operations and pacification operations.

A sample overlay for a strike operation is shown in Figure 12, below, for a regiment assigned an "area of responsibility" (a Korean term).

FIGURE 12

R.O.K. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR STRIKE OPERATIONS<sup>22</sup>



The regimental area is divided into battalion sectors. Within each sector, critical terrain is occupied by platoon or squad-sized combat bases reinforced by reconnaissance teams. When feasible, combat bases are located near road networks. Each battalion keeps one company (minus) in reserve.<sup>23</sup>

The concept is to saturate an area with small units, which consolidate when a large guerrilla force is located. Although patrols from the combat base are used, another popular method is to form a combat-base ambush site. Korean soldiers may occupy such an ambush site for days with no smoking, talking, or cooking.

The keys to the R.O.K. operation are patience, perseverance and rapid reaction of reserves. Testimony to the success of these operations in Vietnam is shown in two sample reports from action in the I Corps area.

ROK Operations: On 10 Aug 24 km west of Cam Ranh Bay, elements of the 30th Regt, in four contacts, killed 16 VC and captured three weapons without friendly loss. This action was part of Operation SHUNG MA 13, conducted 9-18 Aug. Final results were: enemy 36 KIA, one PW and five weapons captured. Friendly results were one ROK WIA. Other ROK contacts were brief engagements resulting from ambush and patrol operations. On 6 Aug there were seven such contacts by elements of the 26th, 28th and 29th ROK Regts, resulting in 29 enemy KIA and eight weapons captured with only one ROK WIA.<sup>24</sup>

ROK Operations: Elements of the CRID terminated Operation BUN KAE 68-5 on 16 Jan. The operation was conducted SW of Phy My (BR 805575) against elements of the E 210 LE Bn. ROK forces killed 170 enemy as opposed to five friendly KIA and 14 WIA. Weapons and ammunition captured included 247 SA, 25 CSW, 80,747 rounds of SAA, 387 rounds 60mm mortar, 353 rounds 82mm mortar, 90 rounds 81mm mortar, 213 rounds 57mm RR, 57 rounds 75mm RR and 102 B-40 rocket rounds.<sup>25</sup>



Except for the qualities of execution, the concept of strike operations is the same as the American version. All of the techniques employed by the R.O.K. Army can be found, for example, in the American Army FM 31-16, Counter guerrilla Operations, but the R.O.K. Army's training and discipline are more rigid.

#### Pacification Operations

Pacification operations are aimed at gaining the support of the populace for the government. Methods currently employed by the government include limited press censorship; the presentation of well-produced, entertaining television dramas which are both pro-government and anti-communist; a prohibition against watching North Korean television broadcasts; the successful New Village Program; technical and cultural aid to small towns; scholarships; and a variety of social services.

The Army itself is highly visible. Korea has a large Army, and service is mandatory for all able-bodied males. Consequently, some male member of almost every family in Korea has been, is, or will be a member of the armed forces, and service to the nation is highly valued within the Korean culture. Additionally, the Army participates in a variety of school construction, road repair and other engineering civic action projects which enhance its image.

Pacification operations are distinguished from strike operations in the following ways.<sup>26</sup>

CLASSIFICATION	STRIKE	PACIFICATION
Operational purpose	Support pacification operations	Support of internal development
Primary objective	Destruction of the enemy guerrilla unit	Retention of territory

CLASSIFICATION	STRIKE	PACIFICATION
Type of operation	Offensive (military)	Defensive (political)
Period of operation	Short-term	Long-term

U.S. and Korean theory are the same. Korea is simply one case study in applied pacification operations. The society also permits the use of some measures undertaken by the R.O.K. government which would be considered harsh in the United States.

#### DEFENSE

Defensive tactics correspond to the American fire base concept used in Vietnam. The Koreans used, and continue to use, a more austere fire base, yet operations are conducted in much the same manner. A security element, artillery, mortars and antitank elements are positioned on a battalion-sized firebase, while the remaining companies patrol within the assigned area of responsibility, similar to strike operations.

War stories from Vietnam are replete with tales of Korean bases established on open hilltops, with blazing fires and songfests at night, apparently defying anyone to attack their position. Certainly, such acts had a psychological impact, but perimeter security was always a requirement.

Operations in Vietnam were enhanced by selective cruelty. Using intelligence nets, agents were identified and punished as a warning to others, and the Korean forces were often avoided to prevent retaliation.

The base defense is still an active part of Korean doctrine. Basic considerations for the defense include appropriate use of terrain, warning nets, all-around defense, defense in depth and protection of lines of supply.<sup>27</sup> Two methods of organizing a battalion area are shown on the following page.

FIGURE 13

KOREAN BASE DEFENSE: BATTALION IN LOWLANDS<sup>28</sup>





FIGURE 14

KOREAN HILLTOP BASE DEFENSE<sup>29</sup>



In either case, both short-range and long-range reconnaissance patrols are employed. Detailed counterattack plans are rigidly rehearsed. In addition to passive security measures, combat patrols and convoy patrols are dispatched from the base, and surrounding key terrain is occupied.<sup>30</sup>

Except for diagramming techniques and the emphasis on counterattacks, the overall concept for conducting a base defense is the same as U.S. tactics.<sup>31</sup> Another difference, reflecting the Korean emphasis on mobility, is heavy use of mortars as opposed to artillery.

#### OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Little need be said about such offensive actions as patrolling, ambushes, raids, search and destroy, and cordon and search. The tactical forms parallel the American Army's tactics; it is only in the preparation, the training, and the spirit of execution that the conduct of each operation differs from the U.S. variety. Korean maneuvers are rehearsed, planned in detail, methodical, and violent. In Vietnam, since the Koreans could not afford to conduct the war with artillery and airstrikes, they were also compelled by logistics to fight a war of close combat.

There is perhaps no more eloquent description of the nature of R.O.K. offensive tactics than the account of cordon and search operations written by Lieutenant General William R. Peers:

The ROK's have by far the most expertise in cordon and search operations of any of the forces I have seen in SVN. There are several key elements in their conduct of this type of operation. First, they are thorough in every detail in their planning. Secondly, their cordon involves a comparatively small area, probably not in excess of 9 to 10 square kilometers for a regimental size force. Third, the maximum force is employed, generally consisting of a regiment up to something in excess of a division. And finally, the operation is rehearsed and critiqued before it is begun. Units are moved into locations around the periphery of the cordon by a variety of means, including helicopters, trucks and by foot, but so timed that all arrive in position simultaneously to complete the encirclement. The density of the troops is such that the distance between individuals on the cordon is less than 10 meters. They leave little opportunity for the enemy to exfiltrate in small numbers. Areas, such as streams and gulleys, are

barricaded with barbed wire and other barrier materials, reinforced by troops who may remain in water chest deep over night. The closing of the cordon is very slow and deliberate, not a rock is left unturned or piece of ground not probed. When the area has been cleared, they will surge back and forth through it to flush out any of the remnants. Another critical feature of their operation is the availability of reaction forces. The enemy soon knows when such a cordon is put around him. If he cannot ex-filtrate by individuals or in small numbers, he may attempt to mass his forces and break out at one point. Against such contingencies the ROK's utilize several reaction forces to reinforce critical areas. They have found that the enemy may make one or even several feints at various points around the cordon prior to making the main effort to breach the encirclement. Hence, the ROK deployment of reaction forces is by small incremental elements until such time as the main effort is located, and then the action becomes rapid and positive. Through the use of these tactics, the ROK's have developed the cordon and search operation to a fine state of art. The ratio of enemy to friendly casualties has been phenomenal -- on one occasion in excess of 100 to 1. These operations are not applicable to all areas within II CTZ, nor for that matter are they effective within the entire ROK AO. They are, however, highly productive in the low, rather heavily populated coastal areas. These ROK operations have been so effective that I am of the belief that a detailed study should be made of them to be incorporated in the US Service School system.<sup>32</sup>

#### COUNTERINFILTRATION OPERATIONS

As stated previously, the Republic of Korea faces constant infiltration attempts; however, infiltration does not refer only to one or two-man groups, but to elements up to battalion size.\* To counter this threat, the R.O.K. Army has organized counterinfiltration battalions and has reinforced the Homeland Reserve Forces. In recent years, counterinfiltration efforts have accounted for most U.S. aid to Korea.<sup>33</sup>

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\*For a detailed account of North Korean infiltration techniques, see Republic of Korea, FM 31-6-2; Counterinfiltration Operations, (Seoul, Korea: Government Printing Office, 1979).

The principles of all R.O.K. counterinfiltration (CI) operations are detection, delay by a CI force, then attack and destruction by a larger force.<sup>34</sup> The procedure for developing the operational concept is to first determine the enemy's anticipated infiltration routes and anticipated objectives. Next, the enemy's most probable withdrawal routes and helicopter pick-up zones are analyzed, and friendly defense priorities are established. CI defense plans are prepared by all services, including Homeland Reserve Force units; Army Headquarters combines and coordinates the plans. Army and HRF units routinely rehearse counterattacks in their assigned areas.<sup>35</sup>

#### Counter Ground Infiltration Tactics

In planning a CI operation against ground infiltration, the R.O.K. commander first establishes countermeasures for each anticipated enemy infiltration route in his sector. He attempts to maximize troop strength by assigning active missions for the reserve and reconnaissance units. Fire support planning does not call for concentrated fires, but for maximum area coverage. The unit maximizes the use of obstacles and barriers, and establishes a mobile counterattack force.

The key to the operation is the creation of an interdiction line. The line must utilize natural obstacles, allow rapid occupation, block the enemy's anticipated infiltration routes, and also be suitable for use as a line of penetration for friendly forces.<sup>36</sup>

The Korean Army considers probable enemy infiltration routes to be administrative and combat boundaries, thickly forested areas, isolated mountains, areas where the R.O.K. Army's security measures have been neglected, areas where the enemy can easily orient himself (such as gullies and railroad tracks), and any area where he can use underwater infiltration techniques.<sup>37</sup>

These operations are not strictly a mission for CI units. An infantry division or brigade, having been alerted to a possible infiltration, may execute a full-scale CI operation. A sample order for a division already defending would include paragraphs 2 and 3 as shown below.<sup>38</sup>

2. MISSION. The division, while accomplishing its present defense mission, controls the operations of police and Homeland Reserve Forces in sector and executes a counter ground infiltration operation.

3. EXECUTION.

ka. Concept of the Operation.

(1) Maneuver.


33d Infantry Regiment at the FEBA, 31st Infantry Regiment in the west, 32d Infantry Regiment in the east, and the engineer battalion in the division rear area control the operations of police and Homeland Reserve Forces in their sectors and conduct a counterinfiltration operation.

In order to completely block and destroy the enemy's infiltration, we thoroughly secure the DMZ south of the Military Demarkation Line, reinforce the barricade line, and utilize GPs as appropriate.

The concept of the operation continues with a description of three phases. In the first phase, guard posts (GPs) are fortified, and the infantry conducts patrols and ambushes. In the second phase, troops and equipment are concentrated at the barricade line and search and destroy operations begin. In Phase Three the division establishes roving patrols and ambushes from the FEBA to the division rear boundary and captures or kills any remaining or withdrawing enemy. The division tank company serves as division reserve. One regiment has the additional mission of control and processing of farmers.

FIGURE 15

COUNTER GROUND INFILTRATION OVERLAY<sup>39</sup>



The only significant difference between this overlay and an area defense overlay are the addition of the interdiction lines and the use of one regiment forward and two back.



The difference between this counterinfiltration operation and U.S. operations is immense, yet simple to describe; there is no such corresponding U.S. Army doctrine! The same holds true for counter air and counter sea operations, the discussion of which follows.

The counterinfiltration operations described herein were developed by the South Korean Army to meet a specific threat and are unique. The American Army could benefit from a detailed study of these tactics.

#### Counter Sea Infiltration Tactics


Counter sea infiltration tactics are a combined operation between the Army, Navy and Coast Guard. The Coastal Security Element provides early warning of enemy infiltration attempts, and regional police companies and battalions provide initial capture efforts. The Army provides in-depth operations and mop-ups.<sup>40</sup> Sea infiltration, too, is a real-life concern to South Korea, particularly in the Pusan-Chinhae area. The Army's role is critical, since the North Koreans are known to use underwater infiltration from off-shore vessels.

Special considerations for CI operations include the positioning of infantry crew-served weapons to fire on sea vessels, control of fishing boats and fishermen, and integration of civilian police into the scheme of maneuver.<sup>41</sup>

In developing the execution plan, a mechanized brigade first analyzes probable enemy ground infiltration routes from the coast and probable enemy objectives. In the sample analysis below, probable objectives are shown by numbered circles.


FIGURE 16

TERRAIN ANALYSIS FOR SEA INFILTRATION<sup>42</sup>



Based upon the terrain analysis, the sector is sub-divided. Mechanized units are considered ideal for this operation because the coastline of the Peninsula is extremely long and resources are limited. The coastline in the above overlay, for example, is sixty kilometers long. The brigade may arrange its battalions in several configurations depending on the terrain analysis. In the overlay below, the 101st Brigade has elected to operate with three battalions on the coastline and one battalion to the rear, widely dispersed.

FIGURE 17  
COUNTER SEA INFILTRATION OVERLAY<sup>43</sup>



The 5th Battalion is maintained as a counterattack force. Although only one platoon base is shown in each company sector, all companies of the brigade may deploy two or three such bases if the terrain favors their use. Other platoons are used for reconnaissance and ambushes.

Counter Air Infiltration Tactics

As with the other CI techniques discussed so far, counter air infiltration operations are as applicable to peacetime as they are to war.


Note that air infiltration is not the same as airmobile operations; the term refers to covert insertion of troops by helicopter, usually small units of guerrillas.

Curiously, the R.O.K. Army considers sandy areas and golf courses as the most probable landing zones, despite thousands of possible sites throughout the country.

Since air infiltration is easily detectable, the R.O.K. Army assumes that a rapid insertion of two or three saboteurs is the most probable form of action. Consequently, rather than analyzing anticipated guerrilla bases, the Army considers primary targets to be factories, armories and airfields.

Obstacles and anti-aircraft weapons are constantly employed around existing airfields, and the same measures are rapidly employed around known or suspected infiltration landing sites. In the overlay below, the 29th Infantry Division has been reinforced with seven reserve companies. The corps has assigned the division an area of operations.

COUNTER AIR INFILTRATION OVERLAY<sup>44</sup>



Other than the different diagramming techniques, execution is similar to the ground CI operation. Mobility is important, and the intent is to saturate the area as much as possible to counter further air landings. The Homeland Reserve Forces patrol the roads (Highways 3 and 329) and, in this case, were selected for immediate activation because they were already in the respective areas.

Objectives and bases are not assigned, again because mobility is so critical to reacting to the many possible landing sites. Whenever possible, some security elements will be placed on every conceivable landing site within the entire sector.

The reader is again reminded that all the counterinfiltration tactics presented in this chapter are peculiar to the Korean Army. There is no written body of doctrine which corresponds to these techniques in the American Army's tactical literature.

#### FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TEN

<sup>1</sup>Republic of Korea, Unconventional Warfare: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 24-25.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 29-33.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 35-40

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-50 and p. dahp 9.

<sup>13</sup>For a comparison, see U.S. Army, FM 31-16: Counterguerrilla Operations, 27 March 1967, with Change 2, May 1970, also FM 100-20: Internal Defense and Development--US Army Doctrine, Nov 1974, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office).

<sup>14</sup>LTC George G. Forrest, Unconventional Warfare and Psychological Operations, Lesson Plan, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1979), p. LP2-13.

<sup>15</sup>Republic of Korea, Psychological Operations: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. dahp 3.

<sup>16</sup>For a better understanding of the Korean PSYOPS situation, see Richard H. Orth, "Translation Problems", pp. 506-508, and 7th PSYOP Group, "A North Korean Defector", pp. 518-534, in DA Pamphlet No. 525-7-2, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application, (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 1976).

<sup>17</sup>Republic of Korea, Counter Unconventional Warfare Operations: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), p. 5.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>U.S. Army, Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 18.

<sup>25</sup>U.S. Army, Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 20.

<sup>26</sup>Republic of Korea, Counter Unconventional Warfare, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>31</sup>See FM 31-16, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

<sup>32</sup>U.S. Army Adjutant General, Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 4th Infantry Division; I Field Force Vietnam, Period 1967-1968, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 9.

<sup>33</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate, Investigation on the Preparedness Program On the Combat Readiness of United States and South Korean Forces in South Korea, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 7.

<sup>34</sup>Korea, Counter Unconventional Operations, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>36</sup>Korea, Counter Unconventional Operations, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., pp. dahp 7-8.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., Overlay No. 2, (issued separately).



<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., Overlay No. 3 (issued separately).

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., Overlay No. 4 (issued separately).

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., Overlay No. 6 (issued separately).

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### SUMMARY OF TACTICAL DIFFERENCES

The Republic of Korea is a unique case. She uses American tactics, yet she does not. The Korean Army has taken the framework of U.S. tactical doctrine, retained appropriate parts, modified where necessary, and developed new tactics when required.

Even the same tactics on paper can be different on the ground. Korea has executed U.S. tactics in a unique manner through the use of different task organizations, different units, equipment and philosophy of execution. The detailed planning and methodical execution of a Korean ground operation are the result of culture and the Korean personality.

Once executed, the R.O.K. operation is conducted with ferocity and vigor. The spirit of jungshin is expected to compensate for being outnumbered or under-supplied.

Above all, South Korea's tactics have been developed to meet one stated threat--North Korean invasion. Major characteristics of North Korean tactics are the retention of key terrain, particularly mountaintops, the interception of supply lines and the infiltration of rear areas to destroy the reserves, interdict combat service support and block withdrawal routes. The infiltration of the rear area in combat is considered so critical that South Korea has added an extra battalion to each regiment solely for the rear area security mission.

#### CONVENTIONAL ATTACK OPERATIONS

Korean offensive operations are similar to U.S. tactics of a few years ago. Although they differ little from our previous tactics, they differ considerably from our current tactics.

The R.O.K. Army does not recognize the hasty attack as a viable option. Korean tactical philosophy stresses preparation and avoids hasty confrontations.

Although mechanized and motorized units exist, most Korean units are light infantry. Where terrain and the enemy situation permit, infantry troops move to battle in trucks. Mobility and firepower of the R.O.K. infantry division are less than those of the equivalent U.S. division.

Whereas U.S. doctrine orients on destruction of the enemy force, R.O.K. doctrine places equal emphasis on the seizure and retention of key terrain, since terrain is a keystone of North Korean operations. R.O.K. doctrine and cultural philosophy also dictate a credo of annihilating the enemy force; hence, enemy units are seldom bypassed.

The American commander cross-attaches units based on analysis of relative combat power on each avenue of approach. The Korean commander invariably attacks with two regiments forward and one in reserve. In a four-regiment division, the fourth regiment provides rear area security.

By far the greatest difference is the infiltration unit. The Korean division selects a ground infiltration objective, an air infiltration objective, or both. A ground infiltration unit secures terrain which provides a base of fire for the main attack. An air infiltration unit secures an objective which blocks enemy resupply, reinforcement or withdrawal.

In the exploitation, the Korean corps uses committed units as well as uncommitted units. The U.S. force uses only uncommitted units.

The only Korean form of attack which has no U.S. doctrinal correspondent is the mountain attack.

## CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE TACTICS

The American Army has adopted the active defense, which is force-oriented rather than terrain-oriented.

The Republic of Korea views the defense of Seoul as essential to the defense of Korea. Since only thirty miles separate Seoul from the Demilitarized Zone, Korea has adopted a "defense far forward" strategy, positioning the bulk of its forces north of Seoul. This, plus unfavorable terrain and a paucity of mobile forces, negates the use of the active defense. The U.S. concept, for example, calls for "trading space for time". In Korean eyes, nothing could be more misguided or fatal than trading space for anything.

The active defense also requires maximum use of long-range direct-fire weapons to inflict casualties on the enemy at as far a distance as possible. The Korean terrain allows few long-range fields of fire and the Korean arsenal is relatively weak in long-range direct fire weapons.

Of course, the United States light infantry division still employs the position defense, but a renewed war would see mixed forces in Korea, presumably mobile.

The R.O.K. has retained the area defense and the mobile defense. Since there is only one R.O.K. mechanized division, the mobile defense has only limited application in U.S. terms. Korean defenses are relatively static, focus on retaining key terrain and are marked by the tenacious defense of prepared positions.

As with the offense, the Korean defensive posture normally consists of two regiments forward and one in reserve. The regiment initially performing the G.O.P. mission reverts to division reserve.

There are variations of the area defense, or position defense, which the R.O.K. Army considers separate defense forms. The mountain defense is unique. The Korean force does not defend from the peak, but rather defends on the forward slope with the peak to the rear, presenting a tenacious defense with little possibility for withdrawal.

#### AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Korean airborne doctrine is borrowed from U.S. doctrine. Most differences revolve around command and control procedures.

The Korean airborne force does not use tanks, as does the U.S. division. Combat service support in the Korean airborne force is more austere.

Planning at the Korean division level is much more detailed than at the U.S. division headquarters.

#### AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

Airmobile operations may be a division-sized U.S. operation; the R.O.K. Army seldom uses more than a reinforced battalion.

For lack of assets, attack helicopters are the exception in R.O.K. airmobile operations.

In American operations an airmobile force may conduct offensive, defensive or retrograde actions. The Korean airmobile concept is strictly an offensive one. In Korea, also, the airmobile operation is not a special case. When lift assets are available, an airmobile unit secures an air infiltration objective as an integral element of a division attack.

In the U.S. Army the selection of reserves is situation-dependent; the Korean battalion designates a company as the reserve. The American

force's mission is enemy-oriented; the Korean airmobile force is always assigned a terrain objective.

#### AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

There are no significant tactical differences.

#### UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

In reviewing the Korean theory of unconventional warfare (UW), there is little difference between Korean and U.S. doctrine. Yet the Koreans conducted operations in Vietnam quite differently than did U.S. forces. The key to this difference is in the manner of execution and in the training of the R.O.K. soldier.

The Korean commander did not try to fight the war from a distance by aircraft and artillery, because he did not have the assets. He was forced by logistics to find the enemy and meet him in close combat.

The principal UW unit in Korea, the Special Warfare Brigade, is patterned after U.S. Special Forces, but there are conceptual dissimilarities. Many of its missions involve performing the roles of conventional units.

The R.O.K.'s counter-UW system involves Army units, Homeland Reserve Forces and civilian police. An active intelligence net and infrastructure are already performing well.

In ground tactical operations, the R.O.K. force seldom uses extended full-scale patrols covering large distances. They prefer to use small reconnaissance teams to gather intelligence for the main force, which rests and rehearses the next operation. They attempt to locate a sizeable enemy force and engage it only when close combat on favorable terms is possible.

The significant difference in tactical form, however, is counter-infiltration tactics, a unique Korean development. Since there is no corresponding U.S. doctrine, there is no need to recount the description of these tactics. Suffice it to say that air, sea and ground versions of CI operations exist, they have a thorough doctrinal framework, and U.S. troops are not trained in them.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

How significant are the differences between U.S. and Korean Army tactics? In time of war, would the conduct of combined operations be hampered or endangered as a result of tactical differences alone? If so, what actions can U.S. or R.O.K. forces take now which would minimize such dangers in advance of actual war?

To attempt to answer these questions, we will wargame four possible scenarios: a U.S. division fighting as part of a combined R.O.K. - U.S. corps, a U.S. brigade attached to and fighting with a R.O.K. division, a U.S. battalion attached to a R.O.K. regiment in a conventional scenario, and finally a U.S. battalion attached to a R.O.K. regiment in an unconventional warfare scenario. Of course, all of these scenarios could have been reversed by placing a R.O.K. unit in attachment to a U.S. unit, and the problems would not be identical. However, since there are considerably more R.O.K. than American divisions in Korea, the scenarios chosen seem more realistic.

The analyses will be deliberately pessimistic; each scenario will try to portray the absolute worst case.\*

Once the problem areas have been developed, we will determine possible remedies.

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\*To depict the best case would serve no purpose; a description of an operation without problems could be handled in one sentence: "The operation went smoothly." One must be careful of the term "worst case" also. We must be certain to generate for analysis only those foreseeable problem areas which could result directly from differences in tactics. Since force structure was stated to be a determinant of tactics, however, obvious differences in equipment and organization will be included in the analysis.



### SCENARIO 1: A U.S. DIVISION IN A R.O.K.-U.S. CORPS

This scenario does not include the existing I Corps (R.O.K.-U.S.) Group, which now has several South Korean divisions and the U.S. 2d Infantry Division, although the reader may make his own analysis incorporating I Corps. I Corps Group has existed as a combined organization for years, and we may assume that many tactical problem areas have been smoothed out over the years during combined exercises. Because of the U.S. personnel rotation policy, this may not be the case. In any event, the author makes no pretext of knowing the functioning of the I Corps Headquarters well enough to make any assumptions. Consequently, this analysis pertains to an infantry division deployed to Korea three months after the outbreak of hostilities.


In this scenario the notional U.S. 19th Infantry Division arrives in Seoul, Korea, in June 19 and is attached to the notional South Korean XVI Corps; all other divisions in the Corps are Korean. The assumptions are that both R.O.K. and U.S. forces are using 1980 tactics and that North Korean forces are using the same tactics described in Chapter Two. Also, all forces are organized and equipped generally as they were in 1980.

The U.S. 19th Infantry Division arrives in Korea with only two officers in the G-2 section who speak Korean. Most of the officers in the R.O.K. XVI Corps speak English with varying degrees of proficiency.

XVI Corps' first mission will be an attack to restore the FEBA. The 19th Division, fully equipped and supplied with all essentials to include ammunition, is assigned an attack mission. The XVI Corps prepares a written operations order in both Korean and English.

FIGURE 19

OPERATIONS OVERLAY FOR NOTIONAL XVI CORPS



The 19th Infantry Division is to "attack and secure Objectives 1 and 2, and annihilate all enemy in sector." The American division commander decides to attack Objective 1 with the 1st Brigade and Objective 2 with the 2d Brigade. The 3rd Brigade follows 2d Brigade, but detaches one battalion as division reserve. On order, an intensive artillery preparation begins on both objectives.

During the division's advance, observers spot a company of helicopters flying along the eastern flank. Before they are taken under fire, several officers recognize them as obsolete U.S. models, and the division avoids an incident. The helicopters, despite intense North Korean fire, land somewhere north of Objectives 3 and 4 and heavy gunfire breaks out immediately.

In the American sector, meanwhile, the artillery is pounding Objectives 1 and 2, and huge gouges are blown out of the forward slopes of the hills. As the artillery lifts and the lead brigades begin to ascend the hills, the North Koreans move from behind the hills in trenches to the military crest facing the assault. As the exhausted American forces reach a point about 70% of the way up the hill, the North Koreans open up with hand grenades and machinegun fire from pillboxes. Because of the topography, the American forces are now too close to the enemy to use artillery. Direct fire is doing nothing to the fortified positions.

The American commander calls for close air support. The aircraft are approved, and the airstrikes begin. The XVI Corps orders Weapons Hold status on all air defense artillery fires. Simultaneously, Russian-made aircraft are observed flying at high altitude over the friendly airstrikes. The F-4s interdict three aircraft and as the aircraft approach division rear, ADA Weapons Tight status is declared; division ADA systems account for four more downed aircraft. Enemy paracute troops begin descending on the division rear area. The division reserve battalion is dispatched to counterattack the parachutists as the combat support troops of the division begin to suffer heavy losses. They are blocked by two companies of North

Korean troops pre-infiltrated into the area and positioned astride the main avenue of approach into the division rear. The XVI Corps eventually commits a regiment from the reserve to reestablish the 19th Division's rear.

Because of effective close air support, the 19th Division's assault is successful. The division secures Objectives 1 and 2 and reconsolidates. The Corps remains in place while intelligence is gathered. Division is ordered to attack new Objectives 1 and 2 the following night, allowing 24 hours for planning and rehearsal.

At 2300 hours, the division crosses the LD/LC, with the reconnaissance battalion leading. Supplies are loaded, and the division S&T Battalion brings up the rear several kilometers behind the leading brigades. Three kilometers out, the reconnaissance battalion encounters an armed force astride the division boundary, and immediately takes them under fire. Casualties are sustained on both sides, before it is determined that the other force is the infiltration battalion of the adjacent division, in place to support the 23rd Notional R.O.K. Division's attack.

The attack continues. Suddenly, long columns of trucks are seen to the east moving northward, two kilometers forward of the 19th Division's reconnaissance elements. The G-3 notifies the R.O.K. Division G-3, who informs him that the trucks are the lead elements of the division, moving to an attack position. Corps is notified, and the Corps commander is furious that the U.S. division is slowing his attack. "What the hell do you think your trucks are for, anyway?" he demands. The corps dismounts immediately and the attack is held up.

After moving one kilometer further, the 1st Brigade encounters a battalion-sized North Korean position. The division commander orders the brigade commander to withdraw and he so notifies the corps commander. "You have met the enemy," the corps commander states, "and you are to destroy him to the last man."

"We can easily bypass," replies the American commander. "We can fix him with artillery, and the Corps reserve can mop him up. We must press on to the objective; you told me this morning that retention of key terrain is highly critical."

"If the enemy is there," replies the Corps commander, "that terrain is key terrain, at least to him. We do not have the artillery assets to drop on him all night, and the reserve force cannot reach your location for an hour. You are infantry, the enemy is infantry, so destroy him."

Not being particularly well trained in night fighting and being unfamiliar with the terrain, the U.S. 1st Brigade suffers heavy losses before driving the enemy from his position. The division commander moves the reserve battalion to secure the position, then continues the attack.

Eventually, the R.O.K. and U.S. divisions both secure their objectives, despite heavy losses.

The XVI Corps is ordered to defend. Let us now artificially change our scenario to make the 19th Infantry a mechanized division, for the sole purpose of injecting problems occasioned by the active defense. The next day, the 19th Division faces a two-division North Korean attack. The North Korean dismounted infantry are not observed until they have approached the reconnaissance battalion, two kilometers out from the covering force. The


covering force is unable to use their long-range antitank weapons since there are no armor targets. The North Koreans have elected to use their armor units in the South Korean division's sector, where anti-armor defenses are known to be weak. The covering forces of both divisions are forced to withdraw at approximately the same time.

As the attack progresses, the 2d Brigade of the U.S. force finds its position untenable and reports that they are moving to a subsequent battle position. Soon, one battalion of the 1st Brigade is forced to follow suit. In another hour, the same process is repeated, requiring the remaining battalions of the 1st Brigade to remove to avoid being cut off. The 23d R.O.K. Division, to the east, observes the movement and believes that the U.S. force is being routed. Panic ensues in some of the R.O.K. companies, and a few enlisted men, in anger and desperation, begin firing at the American forces. The R.O.K. commanders restore order.

In any event, the R.O.K. forces, despite heavy losses, are attempting to hold ground in the exact positions in which they had begun fighting. The North Korean divisions which had been attacking in the U.S. sector see an opportunity to assail the R.O.K. division's flanks and do so. When the Corps commander is informed, he commits the reserve division to a counter-attack in the 23rd R.O.K. division's sector. As the R.O.K. reserve becomes engaged, a parachute force of North Koreans is dropped into the U.S. division's rear. Corps has no reserves left to meet this threat, and the U.S. division turns its attention to self-protection. The R.O.K.s continue the battle. The situation at this point is depicted on the following page.

FIGURE 20

AN UNSUCCESSFUL COMBINED R.O.K.-U.S. DEFENSE



In later operations, good U.S. intelligence shows that a North Korean infantry company is occupying a blocking position astride one of the division's avenues of approach to an objective. The division commander initiates a battalion size airmobile assault. The battalion attacks and destroys the enemy force, then returns by helicopter to rejoin its brigade. The R.O.K. Corps commander is again infuriated. First, the U.S. division has initiated a separate combat action which did not fit into the Corps scheme of maneuver. Also, the American force gained no ground for

the corps; they did not retain the terrain. North Korean forces can again move into the area and block the friendly assault. Finally, the airborne assault should have supported the overall scheme by taking place behind the division objective. Convinced that the American commander is a dare-devil and a grandstander, the R.O.K. Corps commander orders the division's aviation battalion attached to corps control, where they "properly belong, anyway." The American commander refuses, and cooperation becomes practically nonexistent.

The problems shown in the above scenario would be greatly magnified if dissimilar units had been involved. For example, had either division been mechanized or armor, further difficulties would be posed by logistics, different equipment, variations in speed of movement, and lack of knowledge of how to employ the units. These problems, though, would exist in a pure U.S. corps as well, and do not reflect differences in tactics.

In this doomsday scenario, several problems caused many lives to be lost. Again, the scenario represents a deliberate worst case, and the incidence of all the problems in one operation is certainly exaggerated. The scenario is entirely possible, however. The problems can be summarized:

<u>Problem Cause</u>	<u>Result</u>
1. Unawareness of R.O.K. air infiltration objectives.	Confusion.
2. Lack of coordination regarding rear area protection.	Casualties.
3. Unawareness of R.O.K. ground infiltration unit.	U.S. and R.O.K. casualties.
4. Unawareness of R.O.K. infantry unit truck movements.	Confusion; possibly U.S. troops firing on R.O.K. unit.



<u>Problem Cause</u>	<u>Result</u>
5. U.S. dismounted movement vs. R.O.K. truck movement.	Attack slowed; coordination difficult.
6. U.S. bypassing forces vs. R.O.K. "annihilation" concept.	Confusion and lack of coordination. In some instances, R.O.K. forces could move through a U.S. sector thinking all enemy have been cleared.
7. R.O.K. emphasis on night attack vs. U.S. relative de-emphasis.	Casualties.
8. U.S. active defense vs. R.O.K. static defense.	Encirclement. Confusion. Casualties.
9. Different airmobile concepts.	Confusion.

#### SCENARIO 2: A U.S. BRIGADE WITH A R.O.K. DIVISION

It is unnecessary to recount an entire scenario for a brigade in the same manner as the previous account. Rather, with the basic elements already described, it is sufficient to determine how the brigade scenario differs from the division scenario.

First, at brigade level, there is no consideration of separate airmobile operations, so the question can be omitted. The different graphics and control measures for the Korean airmobile operation would cause problems; however, even those are minimized by the R.O.K. Army's conduct of such operations at battalion level only.

In this scenario, let us assume that the U.S. 3rd Brigade of any infantry division is attached to a notional 29th R.O.K. Infantry Division. There are obviously going to be logistical difficulties, in the sense that a U.S. brigade is not as self-sufficient as a division, but this is exogenous to the tactical question. Let us address each of the problem areas encountered by the hypothetical U.S. 19th Infantry Division in Scenario 1.

If the U.S. brigade commander is ordered to detach a battalion for the air infiltration unit, he will not understand what his role is. He will protest transporting his battalion in what he believes to be inferior aircraft piloted by untrustworthy Korean pilots. He may even get the impression that his battalion is being sent on some sort of suicide mission behind enemy lines to gain time for the Korean units to march securely through uncontested territory. He will not know how to develop an operations order which accurately reflects the division's intent. Although the infiltration annex is prepared in detail at division headquarters, it may be in the Korean language, and valuable time will be lost in acquiring an accurate translation. A logical R.O.K. division commander will not assign this mission to the American brigade.

Generally the same holds true for the ground infiltration mission. Although the ground infiltration mission is simpler in its concept, there are factors, such as doubt concerning the American troops' ability to identify R.O.K. soldiers from North Korean soldiers, which mitigate against using U.S. forces in this role.

The brigade commander will not have the division's problem of encountering a ground infiltration unit in position. The ground infiltration unit's objective is shown clearly on the division operations overlay. Of course, all the problems of reading the operations overlay remain if the overlay uses Korean symbols. There may be nobody on the American side who can read the Korean labels, and nobody in the Korean division who can accurately translate the labels into acceptable military English.

If the brigade is attacking with the division, movement is a problem. The U.S. infantry brigade will probably have mechanized or armored forces, which cannot utilize their full potential if they are to maintain contact with slower advancing brigades on the flanks. U.S. light infantry battalions may balk at moving close to the battle area in division-supplied trucks. Confusion and problems of coordination will result in either case.

The problems caused by differing philosophies on bypassing enemy forces and problems in the night attack would be identical at brigade and division level.

It is apparent that the most effective use of the U.S. brigade by the R.O.K. division commander would be as the division reserve. This option gives him the maximum benefit of the U.S. brigade's mobility in the counter-attack role. Unfortunately, the infiltration roles are often assigned to the reserve regiment, so a conflict is presented. The division commander must in this case assign these missions to attacking brigades, thereby decreasing his forward combat strength, at least temporarily.

His other remaining option, if he has four regiments or brigades, is to assign the brigade the rear area security mission, even though it is a mission unfamiliar to American brigades. Either of the last two options decreases the overall attacking strength of the division, since the U.S. brigade is generally better armed.

Problems in the defense are similar to those encountered by a U.S. division attached to a R.O.K. corps. The American brigade commander would receive an operations order, with an overlay which depicts several battalion and company battle positions. The U.S. commander proceeds to plan for the

active defense using the division commander's concept. Unfortunately, the "battle positions" on his overlay are in reality blocking positions, and relinquishing any of them could create all of the problems of the division scenario presented earlier. Likewise, his analysis of the terrain in the brigade sector may have initially led him to completely different conclusions regarding placement of troops.

Many of the problems associated with the U.S. 19th Infantry Division are the same as those associated with the brigade, yet several, such as the problem of recognizing the ground infiltration unit, are diminished or eliminated by decreasing the size of the U.S. unit and hence increasing the degree of R.O.K. control.

#### SCENARIO 3: A U.S. BATTALION WITH A R.O.K. REGIMENT

Problems at battalion level are reduced even further, particularly if the battalion is light infantry. Logistics are much more compatible. Unfortunately, at lower levels, chances for qualified interpreters are reduced; it is assumed that attached noncommissioned officers or junior officers are almost completely unaware of tactical differences.

The U.S. battalion would be briefed by the regimental commander concerning the infiltration units, and the infiltration objectives would be shown on the overlay. The U.S. battalion would not get the responsive artillery support they are accustomed to, and the battalion would be expected to engage in close combat to a greater degree than they are trained to do. Problems of bypassing forces would be minimized by responsive coordination between commanders.

The American commander in the active defense does not pull out of positions without authority from the next higher headquarters, so the battalion commander would learn quickly that he is to retain his present positions. The prospects for smooth control of the battalion by the R.O.K.s seem better than the R.O.K. corps commander's control of the U.S. division.

SCENARIO 4: A U.S. BATTALION WITH A R.O.K. REGIMENT IN A UW SETTING

In this scenario a U.S. infantry battalion is attached to a South Korean infantry regiment for an indefinite period of time to conduct counter-guerrilla operations. We assume that for political reasons U.S. forces will not conduct active guerrilla operations against North Korea.

In 19 North Korea infiltrated several sabotage teams, small guerrilla units, and at least one full brigade into South Korea. Since there is no jungle or thick forest cover, units are primarily using the mountains for bases, with extensive tunnels and underground CPs.

In December, the R.O.K. regiment is ordered to conduct a series of company-sized ambushes across a twelve-mile mountain pass. Ambushes are to remain in place for five days. The Americans soon find that they are unable to remain in place for more than a few hours without suffering cold injuries. The R.O.K. soldiers are also facing cold-injury problems, and although certainly not immune to cold, are quietly suffering and remaining in position. The American battalion commander has ordered the messhall to deliver hot rations to the soldiers in line. Without attempting to degrade the G.I.s, we can simply assume that the U.S. force does not remain in position for five days without giving away their positions.

The regiment is later assigned an area of operations. Each battalion, including the U.S. battalion, is assigned a base of operations on a hilltop. The battalion commander, who was a company commander in Vietnam, leaves his headquarters company and combat support company on the firebase and assigns each of his line companies an area of operations, ordering them to patrol their sectors for three weeks. He soon discovers that he is not going to be resupplied by air, and that he must provide convoy security for supply trucks. He is forced to call one company back to the base. He soon finds, also, that the battalion must carry the supplies up the hill by hand, since the trucks cannot reach the top.

When one of his companies in the field encounters an enemy force, the commander soon finds that artillery is not available to assist them. He is required to engage the enemy with direct fire.

When the Korean regimental commander orders the battalion to move immediately to counterattack in another battalion's sector, he is amazed to learn that the U.S. commander cannot consolidate his widely separated battalion for at least a day.

In a later action, the regiment is ordered to conduct a counter-infiltration action as part of the division. In this case, the American battalion commander is completely lost, and must improvise his own concept for how the battalion will execute its responsibilities. No matter how ingenious he may be, he will initially have no concept of how to deal with and effectively integrate the civilian police and Homeland Reserve Force units in his sector.

The problems in the UW case are not insurmountable; indeed, even in trying to worst-case the scenario, all the problems are short-term in nature. Despite the author's original inclination that several severe problem areas could be foreseen from differences in UW tactics, they did not develop. More serious problems can be expected from such areas as logistics, language difficulties, and handling of prisoners of war. The differences in tactics remain, however. It is the author's opinion that the Korean tactics are more thorough and have a better chance for success in the Republic of Korea than the U.S. tactics, and they deserve more detailed American study.

#### POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM AREAS

All the problems developed in the preceding scenarios have one factor in common: there were differences in tactical doctrine that each side failed to recognize. There are two obvious blanket solutions to solve this problem. The tactical differences can be eliminated by having both nations use the same tactics, or all members of the chain of command in both Armies can be made aware of the differences in tactics and learn to compromise in a combined operation.

The first solution would be difficult. The Republic of Korea did in fact use American tactics a few years ago, but as the U.S. Army re-oriented its doctrine to a European scenario, the R.O.K. was forced to forego some of the changes and to adopt other tactics. As stated earlier, there are several factors which mitigate against the R.O.K. adopting the active defense, while at the same time, the U.S. Army has committed itself almost exclusively to European-scenario tactics.

The United States must be prepared to combat the threat on battlefields around the world, and we can no more afford to orient U.S. doctrine to the Korean Peninsula exclusively than we can to Europe. Yet there are several options which offer a reasonable solution and the U.S. 2d Infantry Division is the obvious place to start.

It is not necessary for them to adopt R.O.K. Army tactics, but it is necessary that at least the chain of command be aware of the differences. Although the active defense may have some applicability in a Korean War, it could be disastrous in a combined operation. The 2d Infantry Division must not allow the area defense and the mobile defense to become lost arts. At the same time, they should practice the Korean forms of attack with particular emphasis on counter-infiltration operations.

This is fine for the division already in Korea; what about contingencies? Any U.S. division with a contingency mission for the R.O.K. should receive training in both North and South Korean tactics and must place priority on night training. In the event of war a R.O.K. battalion should be assigned to each such division prior to deployment to conduct intensive training for the division.

If training in Korean-specific tactics is uneconomical or if there is not enough time, then at the very least there should be a handy reference booklet, such as a field manual, which American officers and noncommissioned officers could use in wartime or in combined training exercises. It is ironic that we have manuals on North Korean tactics and Soviet tactics, but none on West German or South Korean doctrine.\*

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\*Fort Leavenworth teaches a unit of instruction which describes other NATO tactics and map symbols, but the Republic of Korea, where U.S. forces have been stationed for nearly 35 years, has been neglected in this regard.



It seems that problems in combined operations were minimized in the above scenarios by decreasing the size unit attached to a R.O.K. parent unit. These results could be partially due to the author's bias that the tighter the degree of parent-unit control, the more rapidly the commander's expectations can be communicated and executed. Indeed, the smaller the American unit, the less dissimilar it becomes to a like Korean unit insofar as equipment and organization are concerned. The recommendation is obvious: whenever possible, cross-attach at the lowest unit level.\*

The technique of avoidance could have some merit also. By assigning one sector of the Peninsula to a United States corps, independent operations can be undertaken which minimize contact with U.S. and R.O.K. personnel except at the highest levels. This is a politically and militarily unsavory choice, however, in light of the Republic of Korea's pride in being able to control the larger military operation in the homeland.

One choice is to retain or expand the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) Program. Although excellent in spirit and execution, this program, which involves primarily younger enlisted men and noncommissioned officers, does not address or remedy the tactical problem. The enlisted men can teach and acquire techniques, but know little about tactical doctrine.

The continuing standardization programs for military equipment and armament are valuable, but time could be a critical factor. Recall that

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\*I realize that this is a novel approach in that it does violate most accepted military thought. We have little previous experience in this area; further research should be conducted. There are successful historical examples of such unit integrations, such as the British experience with multi-ethnic armies in India. The thrust of my recommendation is that some empirical research should be tried in Korea in a peacetime environment.

some differences in tactics result from differences in equipment. The Republic of Korea is rapidly becoming self-sufficient in manufacturing or assembling major items of military equipment, but the future time frame depicted here is too soon for the R.O.K. Army to be equipped the same as the U.S. Army. Indeed, such an event may never occur. Because of the terrain, long-range direct-fire antitank weapons, for example, have much less utility in Korea than in Europe.

Economics has a bearing also. It is still more cost-effective to have two privates dig a tank pit than to buy one more TOW weapon. Nevertheless, any increased standardization reduces tactical differences as well.

#### CONCLUSIONS

There are significant differences in U.S. and Korean tactics, sufficient to cause unnecessary loss of lives in a renewed conflict. The principal recommendations for remedying the problems are training some U.S. units in Korean tactics, developing a field manual which illustrates the differences, presenting instruction on the subject at the U.S. and R.O.K. Army Command and General Staff Colleges, increasing standardization of equipment and arms, and either cross-attaching units at the lowest level possible or avoid cross-attaching units altogether by assigning U.S. forces separate sectors on a corps basis.

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APPENDIX A  
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## APPENDIX B

### ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS: THE SOUTH KOREAN INFANTRY DIVISION

SOURCE: Republic of Korea, Duties of the Operations Officer: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), pp. 18 - 22.

1. Mission. In addition to its normal combat missions, the infantry division is responsible for:
  - a. Preparation for conventional warfare.
  - b. Protection of human life and property.
  - c. Civil defense support.
2. Organization.
  - a. The division is organized into a division headquarters, 3 infantry regiments, one artillery group (division artillery), a tank battalion, and supporting units.
  - b. The division, according to the situation, receives support from higher headquarters or may have augmentation units attached.
3. Staff Organization.
  - a. Staff organization is similar to that of the United States Army.
  - b. The staff is composed of a general staff, a special staff, a personal staff, and specialized officers.
4. Command Posts. Several command posts are used:
  - a. The main command post.
  - b. The tactical command post.
  - c. The rear area command post.
  - d. The interior command post.

5. The Infantry Division's Principal Combat Units.

a. The infantry regiment.

(1) The regiment is composed of a headquarters and headquarters company, 4 infantry battalions, a logistical support company and a medical company.

(2) Mission: To attack and destroy the enemy by fire, maneuver, and close combat.

b. The tank company.

(1) Composed of a headquarters and 4 tank platoons.

(2) Mission: When attached to other maneuver units, to defeat and destroy enemy units by fire, maneuver and shock action.

c. The reconnaissance battalion.

(1) Composed of 4 reconnaissance companies.

(2) Missions:

(a) Light combat actions.

(b) Attached to units whose combat strength has been depleted for use in offensive, defensive and retrograde operations.

(c) Reconnaissance and special combat actions in the enemy's rear areas.

6. Combat Support Units of the Infantry Division. The division has the following organic combat support units.

a. Division artillery.

b. Engineer battalion.

c. Signal battalion.

d. Division aviation company.

e. Chemical support detachment

7. Combat Service Support Units of the Infantry Division.

The following CSS units are organic to the infantry division.

- a. Military police detachment.
- b. Replacement company.
- c. Ordnance service detachment.
- d. Medical service detachment.
- e. Maintenance/transportation service detachment.

## APPENDIX C

### ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS: THE SOUTH KOREAN MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION

SOURCE: Republic of Korea, Duties of the Operations Officer: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978), pp. 22-24.

1. Organization (TOE 17-R0K). The division is organized into a division headquarters, three mechanized infantry brigades, a self-propelled artillery brigade, and an armored reconnaissance battalion.
2. Brigades. The subordinate brigades of the division may be task-organized from the following battalions:
  - a. Three mechanized infantry battalions.
  - b. Three motorized rifle battalions.
  - c. Three tank battalions.
3. Organization of the subordinate maneuver battalions.
  - a. Tank battalion: A headquarters and headquarters company and three tank companies.
  - b. Mechanized infantry battalion: A headquarters and headquarters company and three mechanized infantry companies.
  - c. Motorized rifle battalion: A HHC and three motorized rifle companies. The scout car is the principle means of transportation.
4. The Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. Composed of three armored reconnaissance companies.
5. Subordinate combat support units.
  - a. The field artillery brigade.
    - (1) One 8-inch self-propelled field artillery battalion.
    - (2) Three 155-mm self-propelled field artillery battalions.

- b. Engineer battalion.
- c. Signal battalion.
- d. Aviation detachment.
- e. Chemical support detachment.

## APPENDIX D

### PRINCIPAL R.O.K. ARMY ITEMS OF COMBAT EQUIPMENT: AN ENUMERATION

SOURCE: Republic of Korea, FM 101-10-1, Organizational Descriptions and Military Logistics Resources, (Seoul, Korea: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 5-18 thru 5-26.

#### 1. Small Arms.

Carbine Cal30, M1, M2 (Korean-produced)  
Rifle, U.S., Cal 30, M1  
Rifle, automatic, Cal 30, M1 1918 A2  
Gun, Machine, Cal. 30, M1919 A-6, M1919 A-4  
Rifle, 5.56mm M16 (U.S. and Korean-produced)  
Pistol, cal. 45 M1911A, M1911A1  
Gun, submachine, Cal. 45 M3, M3A1  
Gun, Machine, Cal. 50 M2  
Rifle, 57mm M18, M18A1  
Launcher, Rocket 3.5" M20, M20AB1  
Launcher, Grenade M7  
Bayonet, Knife, M1913  
Bayonet, Knife, M4

#### 2. Indirect Fire Weapons.

Mortar, 60mm M2, M19  
Mortar, 81mm M1, M29  
Mortar, 4.2" M2, M30  
Howitzer, 105mm M2A2  
Howitzer, 155mm M1A1  
Gun, 155mm M2  
Howitzer, 8" M2A1

#### 3. Wheeled Vehicles.

Trailer, Cargo, ¼-ton, M100  
Trailer, Cargo, ¼-ton M10  
Trailer, 1-ton (Korean-produced)  
Trailer, tank water, 1-ton, 2-wheel, 250G/A  
Trailer, tank water, 1½-ton, 2-wheel, 400G/A  
Semitrailer, Van Cargo, 6-ton, M118  
Semitrailer, Stake, 6-ton M118  
Semitrailer, Stake, 12-ton M127.  
Semitrailer, Stake, 20-ton (Korean-produced)  
Semi-trailer, Low-bed, 25-ton, M172  
Automobile, sedan, medium (Korean-produced)  
Truck, ¼-ton, GPW (WWII vintage)

Truck, 1/2-ton, 4x4 Utility, CJ3B-J4C  
 Truck, 1/2-ton, 4x4 Jeep, M606  
 Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4 cargo, J602  
 Truck, 2 1/2-ton, 4x4, Cargo, 2Dw15L, J603  
 Truck, 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, Cargo, M602  
 Truck, 4-ton, Cargo (Korean-produced)  
 Truck, 5-ton, 6x6 Cargo, M54  
 Truck, 6-ton, Cargo (Korean-produced)  
 Truck, 10-ton, 6x6 Cargo, M125  
 Truck, Wrecker, Medium, 4-ton (Korean-produced)  
 Truck, Wrecker, Medium, 5-ton, M543  
 Truck, Wrecker, Medium, 6-ton (Korean-produced)  
 Tractor, 10-ton, M123  
 Transporter, 50-ton, M15A2  
 Tractor, 4-5 ton (Korean-produced)  
 Tractor, 5-ton, M54  
 Tractor, 6-ton (Korean-produced)  
 Truck, 10-ton, 6x6, Tractor, M123

#### 4. Tracked Vehicles.

Carrier, Personnel, Full-tracked Armored, M113  
 Carrier, Personnel, M3A1  
 Gun, self-propelled, M16A1  
 Tank, Medium, M4A3  
 Tank, Medium, 90mm, M47  
 Tank, medium, M48A2  
 Tank, medium, M48A5 (A5 conversion kits Korean-produced)  
 Gun 90mm, Self-propelled, M56  
 Vehicle, Tank, Recovery M32  
 Vehicle, Tank-Recovering, M47

#### 5. Missiles and Associated Equipment.

Tracking Station, Trailer, AN/MPA-5  
 Generator set (Korean-made)  
 Radar Antenna, Trailer, OA-134P/MPA  
 Radar Antenna, Missile, Trailer, AN/MSA-19  
 Antenna, Radar, OA-1596-T, OA-1601/T  
 Antenna, Target-tracking, OA-1487/MPA  
 Missile Test Set (Korean-made)  
 Missile Test Set Carrier, M451  
 Launching Control Indicator, C-2699/TSW  
 Friget Simulator OA-2010/MSW-4  
 Nike-Hercules Monorail Launcher M36  
 Nike-Hercules Missile M6  
 Section, Control, Indicator 2620/TSW



Section, Simulator Group M3, M2  
Launching, Control. Section Trailer AN/MSW-4  
HAWK, Missile XM-3E1  
Illuminator, Continuous Wave, AN-MPQ-33  
Continuous Wave Acquisition Radar, AN/MPQ-34  
Pulse Acquisition Radar, AN/MPQ-35  
Range-only Radar, AN/MPQ-37  
High-Power Illuminator, AN/MPQ-39  
Assault Fire Command Console AN/TSW-4  
Launcher XM-78E 3  
Loader-Transporter XM501-E2

6. Helicopters (Model Numbers Only)

OH-13H  
UH-19D  
CH-21C  
OH-23D  
CH-34C  
CH-37B  
UH-1B  
UH-1D  
CH-54  
CH-47A  
O-1AE  
U-6A  
U-8D







## APPENDIX E















### R.O.K. ARMY OPERATIONAL GRAPHICS

This appendix demonstrates differences in U.S. and R.O.K. military symbology which can cause confusion in reading operations overlays and consequently in conducting combined operations. The first several categories are symbols which Americans can easily misinterpret or misunderstand; the last category are symbols which can confuse the Korean soldier.<sup>1</sup> Each category, obviously, causes mutual misunderstanding.

#### Unit and combat service support symbols using Korean lettering











Until 1978 most Korean symbols were the same as the American, including labelling with American abbreviations, such as "FEBA" or "GOP". Problems with less-educated soldiers caused the R.O.K. Army to revert to Korean lettering. The symbols below are representative of some of the major symbology which differs on Korean and U.S. overlays.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Korean Symbol</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>
Replacement Unit (Company).		
Military Police Company.		
Supply and Service Battalion.		

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Korean Symbol</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>
Military Intelligence Company.		
P.O.W. Collection Point		
(Field) Army Supply Depot.		
Civilian Collection Point		
Straggler Collection Point.		
Salvage Collection Point.		
Headquarters & Headquarters Company		


## Tactical Control Measures Using Korean Lettering

As with unit symbols, diagrammatic techniques for tactical operations now use Korean lettering. In most other respects, the symbols are the same for both countries. The Korean labels are abbreviations which cannot be found in a dictionary. This causes some problems for even R.O.K. officers.

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>R.O.K. Version</u>	<u>U.S. Version</u>
No-fire Line.		
Fire Support Coordination Line.		
Control Line (Phase Line).		
Base.		
Objective	Always numbered. 	Number, Letter, Code Name, or Unit Designation. 

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>R.O.K. Version</u>	<u>U.S. Version</u>
Line of departure/ Line of contact.	○○○○○ 접속선/ 공격선	○○○○○ LD/LC

Forward Edge of  
Battle Area.




#### Differences in Numbering Unit Designations

There are several differences in showing unit designations, partly due to the Korean regimental system and partly due to the Korean practice of omitting some parts of the designation on map symbols. First, Korean companies are numbered, not lettered:

U.S. Infantry Company




Korean Infantry Company



R.O.K. unit symbols show the designation of the unit and its immediate parent unit. U.S. Army symbols include all parent unit data, although it may sometimes be omitted. The example below is of a company of the 41st Field Artillery Battalion, 18th Field Artillery Brigade, 12th Corps:

U.S. Symbol




R.O.K. Symbol




Similarly, a company of the 5th Tank Battalion, directly subordinate to 5th Corps, would appear as follows:

U.S. Symbol



R.O.K. Symbol



### Enemy Unit Designation



The Korean Army uses a completely different designation system for enemy units from the one it uses for friendly units. The U.S. Army uses the same U.S. unit symbols for enemy units as it does for friendly units, except that we draw the symbol in red or in double lines. The R.O.K. Army uses abbreviations for the type unit, as shown below; in service schools only.

#### Type Unit



#### R.O.K. Symbol

#### U.S. Symbol



Enemy Infantry Battalion.



Enemy artillery regiment.

















Enemy armor Company.



## Differing Symbols






For some control measures, the South Korean Army uses different symbols (sometimes only slightly different), from the U.S. version.

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>R.O.K. Symbol</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>
Airborne Drop Zone		
	Always rectangular	Usually circular
Special Forces Battalion.		
Chemical Smoke Company.		
Aviation Battalion.		
Motorized Rifle Battalion.		
		(Note slight difference) Found in FM 21-30, but not commonly known.





<u>Meaning</u>	<u>R.O.K. Symbol</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>
Graves Registration Point		
Searchlight Platoon		

### Conceptual Differences

The following symbols are those which the United States Army does not use because U.S. and Korean units or concepts are different.


<u>Meaning</u>	<u>R.O.K. Symbol</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>
Division Rest Area (R&R Camp).		No equivalent.
.50-Caliber Company (ADA Role).		No equivalent.
Field Army.		 U.S. "equivalent" is the Theater Army.
Ammunition Storage Area (Rear). ( <u>Not</u> the same as ASP).		No equivalent.






<u>Meaning</u>	<u>R.O.K. Symbol</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>
A battalion (minus) and reinforced.		In U.S. doctrine, a unit is "minus" <u>or</u> task organized, not both.
Airborne Operation: Blocking Position (AT) on a Road.		Not Used.
A TOW Company		No equivalent unit.
Illumination Platoon.		No equivalent unit.

#### Major U.S. Symbols Not Used in the R.O.K. Army

There are many U.S. symbols which are not generally understood by the South Korean soldier because the R.O.K. has no equivalent units or tactical concepts. The following are only a representative sample:

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>	<u>R.O.K. Symbol</u>
Airmobile Brigade.		No equivalent unit.


<u>Meaning</u>	<u>U.S. Symbol</u>	<u>R.O.K. Symbol</u>
Maintenance Management Center.		No equivalent agency.
CEWI Battalion.		No equivalent unit.
Battle Position.		Concept not used. R.O.K. Army uses blocking positions.

The point of this appendix is obvious; the U.S. Army and the South Korean Army do use some different map symbols. This appendix makes no pretext of defining all the differences; there are many more. For the most part, the R.O.K. Army uses U.S. military symbology. It is the small differences which can lead an officer of either Army to believe that he understands an operations overlay when he truly does not. Improper communication can waste lives.

A worst-case example is shown on the following page of a R.O.K. defensive operation overlay. Without further comment, let it suffice for the American reader to attempt to interpret it without references.

FIGURE E-1

WORST-CASE MILITARY SYMBOLOGY



E-10

END NOTE TO APPENDIX E

<sup>1</sup>All the symbols shown in this appendix can be found in many sources. The Korean symbology was derived from a review of all the Korean Army source documents used in this work previously, plus the following:

Republic of Korea, Logistics Officer Duties: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978).

Republic of Korea, Division Retrograde Operations: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978).

Republic of Korea, Large Unit Defense: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978).

Republic of Korea, Use of Fire Support: Advance Material, (Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1978).

The American Army symbology was derived from:

U.S. Army, FM 21-30: Military Symbols, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970).

U.S. Army, RB 101-5-1: Operational Terms and Graphics, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979).

## APPENDIX F

### SAMPLE R.O.K. ARMY OPERATIONS ORDER

Source: Korean Army publication, White Paper Tactics (Division Attack).  
(Chinhae, Korea: Army College, 1975), pp. 30-32.

(Security Classification)

11th Infantry Division  
Korea  
19 , M. D-2. 12:00

#### Operations Order No. 5

##### 1. Situation

ka. Enemy Forces: Annex "ka", Intelligence.

na. Friendly Situation:

(1) Sixth Corps, on November 21, secures Hill 360 and City "Ma",  
and continues the attack to the north to secure City "Ka" and City "Na".

da. Attachments and detachments

200th tank battalion (M. D-2. 09:00, attached)

631st FA Battalion ( " )

411, 412 Light Transport Truck Company ( " )

##### 2. Mission

Division attacks M-Month, D-Day, at 06:30, secures Hill 360, and on order prepares to continue the attack to the north, but also prepares to support the passage of lines of 15th Infantry Division.

##### 3. Execution

ka. Concept of the Operation

Attack with two regiments advancing, with 31st Infantry Regiment in the west, 32d Infantry Regiment in the east, and 33d Regiment as reserve, and penetrate enemy positions.

32d Infantry Regiment, as Division main attack, secures Objective "1" and 31st Infantry Regiment, as secondary attack, secures Objective "2".

33d Infantry Regiment initially, as division reserve, gives priority to the main attack sector, and prepares to be committed.

Special Mission Unit (ground infiltration) attacks Objective "3" and, after linking up with the main attack unit, becomes attached.

Priority of fire support is to the 32d Infantry Regiment and to the Special Mission Unit.

Appendix "na", Fire Support Plan.

na. 31st Infantry Regiment

Attached: 1st Company, 200th Tank Battalion.

da. 32d Infantry Regiment

Attached: 200th Tank Battalion (-).

ra. 33d Infantry Regiment

(1) Provide 1 company-sized ground infiltration unit.

- (2) Regiment (-): Division reserve.
- (3) Appendix "da", Infiltration.
- ma. Special Mission Unit (ground infiltration): Appendix "da", Infiltration.
- ba. 200th Tank Battalion
  - 1st Company: Attached to 31st Inf. Regt.
  - Battalion (-): Attached to 32d Inf. Regt.
- sa. 11th Reconnaissance Company
  - Protect Division rear area.
- ah. Division Artillery
  - (1) 41st FA Battalion: DS, 31st Inf. Regt.
  - (2) 42d FA Battalion: DS, 32d Inf. Regt.
  - (3) 43d FA Battalion: DS, Ground Infiltration Unit.
  - After link-up, Division GS and (also) reinforce 42d FA Battalion: DS to 33d Inf. Regt. when committed.
  - (4) 44th FA Battalion: GS.
  - (5) 631st FA Battalion: GS and (also) reinforce 42d FA Bn.
  - (6) Annex "na", Fire Support Plan.
- ja. 11th Engineer Battalion
  - (1) 1st Co.: DS, 31st Inf. Regt.
  - (2) 2d Co.: DS, 32d Inf. Regt.
  - (3) 1st platoon, 3d Co.: Attached to special mission unit.
  - (4) 3d Co. (-): DS to 33d Inf. Regt. when committed.
- cha. 410, 411 Light Transport Truck Company: GS.
- k'a: Division Reserve
  - (1) 33d Inf. Regt (-)
  - (2) 11th Tank Company.
  - (3) Priority to 32d Inf. Regt. sector and prepare to be utilized.
- ta. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) Practice deception.
  - (2) Priority of road use is to the main attack unit.

4. Administration and Logistics: See Admin Order.

5. Command and Signal: Signal Annex "ra".

Acknowledge:

Division Commander Major General      Chun      Ha      Sul

Annexes:

- ka. Intelligence.
- na. Fire Support Plan.
- da. Infiltration.
- ra. Signal.

AUTHENTICATION

Operations Officer Lieutenant Colonel      Chae      Soon      Jung

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)


# OPERATIONS OVERLAY TO OPORD 5



# APPENDIX G

## R.O.K. ARMY AIRBORNE CONTROL MEASURES

FIGURE G-1



To understand the differences between R.O.K. and U.S. airborne concepts, one must understand the differences in diagramming. Whereas the American objectives are lettered, the Korean objectives are numbered. The English term "OBJ", for objective, does not normally appear on the Korean overlay, but was merely translated here. The drop zones are designated and appear on the operations overlay; they appear in a separate annex to the U.S. order. The DZs are lettered in the Korean alphabet.



The division boundary is roughly circular. Although the size of a division boundary is stated to be 14-20 kilometers in radius, the normal method is to use the preparing officer's hand span to measure the radius, usually giving a radius of ten to eleven kilometers on a 1:50,000 map. Regimental boundaries are shown in solid lines, regardless of the number of echelons or phases. It is important to note that each regiment secures its own assigned objectives only, so the operation sometimes resembles a series of three separate assaults. Also, American techniques allow for the use of either sectors or battle areas. In the Korean Army, only sectors are allowed.

Note also the use of the COP (combat outpost). This is an older U.S. Army technique. Contact points are placed on the division boundary. Whereas, U.S. units occupy or at least make contact at these points as soon as possible, the R.O.K. Army occupies these points only after the objectives have been secured.

Rather than assigning the security mission to the air cavalry, the division's organic armored reconnaissance battalion performs the mission. This is the result of a difference in organization, there being no air cavalry in the R.O.K. division. Note that sectors for the recon unit are assigned down to platoon level in the division operations order.

The positions designated by a black dot represent observation posts. An observation post is established on every hillside, where practicable, surrounding the division area--after the objectives have been secured and the regiments have reorganized. The positions represented by the symbol # represent a blocking position strongly reinforced with anti-tank weapons.

These blocking positions are placed on every road, improved or unimproved, leading into the division area.

APPENDIX H  
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION TERMINOLOGY

U.S. ARMY/MARINE  
CORPS TERM

CORRESPONDING  
KOREAN TERM

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Amphibious.   | 1. Over-the-sea.<br>(상륙)                                 |
| 2. Amphibious Withdrawal.                                    | 2. Sea withdrawal.<br>(해안철수)                             |
| 3. Amphibious raid.  | 3. Amphibious surprise<br>attack.<br>(상륙기습)              |
| 4. Amphibious demonstration.                                 | 4. Amphibious diversionary<br>operation.<br>(상륙양동)       |
| 5. Initiating directive.                                     | 5. Initial order.<br>(최초지시)                              |
| 6. Commander, Joint Amphibious<br>Task Force (CJATF) (Navy). | 6. Amphibious maneuver<br>unit commander.<br>(상륙기동부대사령관) |
| 7. Commander, Landing Force<br>(CLF) (Army or Marine Corps). | 7. Amphibious forces<br>commander.<br>(상륙군사령관)           |
| 8. Shore party.  | 8. Coastal unit.<br>(해안부대)                               |

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